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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 Many accounts of the life of Martin Luther King, Jr. begin with the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott and end on the balcony of the Lorraine Motel in 
Memphis, Tennessee.  Others focus on his triumphant “I Have a Dream” speech 
to the exclusion of almost anything else he accomplished during his short 
lifetime.  Still others tell an uncomplicated tale of a humble pastor chosen as 
“Man of the Year” by Time magazine in 1963 and awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1964.  A story less told is that of King’s role as founder and leader of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), “a permanent organization to 
facilitate coordinated action of local protest groups.”1  Originally designed, as the 
name indicates, to operate solely in the South and with the goal of using 
nonviolent principles to engage in boycotts, marches, and voter drives, SCLC 
nonetheless was forced to evolve as the turbulent political and social climate of 
the 1960s brought about violent protest and a recognition by civil rights leaders 
that without a comprehensive view of race, class, and poverty, their goals of 
integration and equality could not be achieved.  For SCLC, that meant the 
creation of the “Poor People’s Campaign” in 1967, a campaign that was the final 
manifestation of the evolution of King’s philosophy during his time as leader of 
the organization. 
                                            
1
 Martin Luther King, Jr. The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr. ed. Clayborne Carson (New 
York: Grand Central Publishing, 1998), 101. 
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 This thesis is not a biography of King, although it will show that this 
campaign was inextricably tied to his goals and vision for SCLC.  It is a work of 
research infused with King’s spirit, as the Poor People’s Campaign (PPC) sprang 
almost wholly from his observations of urban rioting in the North, his opposition to 
the Vietnam War, his frustration with President Lyndon Johnson’s “War on 
Poverty,” and his deep, unyielding belief in the power of nonviolent direct action.  
Without King’s insistence, SCLC might not have initiated such a campaign, and 
indeed his closest advisors tried time and again to dissuade him from continuing.  
That is not to say, however, that the PPC was entirely dependent upon King’s 
actions alone.  Although several members of the SCLC executive team initially 
attempted to dissuade King from carrying out the campaign, they eventually 
came to support the idea.  In fact, with just months to go before the proposed 
start date, they resolved to redouble their efforts and told King that the campaign 
would be “pursued with full energy” on its original schedule.2 That they built 
Resurrection City in Washington, D.C., and still pursued the passage of an 
“Economic Bill of Rights” under the leadership of Ralph Abernathy, King’s 
successor, proves that the organization was ultimately responsible for the 
campaign’s outcome. 
 The PPC “differed from all the SCLC’s previous efforts. For the first time, 
SCLC set out to build a movement from scratch.”3  The organization was clearly 
not equipped to create and maintain such a movement.  What ultimately led to 
                                            
2
 David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (New York: William Morrow Paperbacks, 2004), 618. 
3
 Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 
1987), 359. 
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the PPC’s failure, however, was the very nature of SCLC itself: a nonprofit 
organization that suffered from dysfunction and disorganization during King’s life 
and nearly collapsed after his death.  Competing priorities among the leadership 
along with Abernathy’s inability to maintain SCLC’s prominence in the civil rights 
movement led to further instability and organizational strife.  This thesis will show 
that because the Poor People’s Campaign was created by and operated within 
the formal structure of this nonprofit organization, it was unable to achieve 
success by almost any measure.  SCLC’s organizational structure made it 
extremely difficult to create a national campaign from the ground up, and its 
leadership strategy guaranteed that it would be virtually impossible to sustain that 
kind of national campaign.   
 
Comparing Campaigns 
 The highly visible triumphs of the civil rights era were time and again 
attributable to a combination of local, grassroots activism and individual actors 
who exercised great influence on key decision makers.  Less nimble and 
effective during this particular time period were formal organizations, like SCLC, 
which were often viewed as too slow moving or rigid in their ideologies.  Worse 
yet, long-time residents eyed these organizations with suspicion whenever they 
would swoop in for a campaign and then depart abruptly when their efforts failed 
or a bigger opportunity came along.  Thus, the SCLC suffered acutely from an 
inability to create an organizational structure capable of engaging in high-profile 
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direct action and effective public relations, as well as the more mundane tasks of 
fundraising and bookkeeping. 
 Having successfully completed the “March on Washington for Jobs and 
Freedom” in the summer of 1963, SCLC had certainly proven that with King at 
the helm the organization could overcome internal squabbling and a lack of 
preparation in order to achieve its publicly stated goal to “arouse the conscience 
of America to the need for civil rights legislation.”4  Consequently, less than one 
year later, the Civil Rights of Act of 1964 passed Congress.  Previous positive 
outcomes with the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the seminal event out of which 
SCLC developed, and with Birmingham, combined with a later civil rights victory 
in Selma and the seeming influence the organization exerted on the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations, created an overinflated impression of SCLC’s 
actual power.  To most outsiders, the organization appeared far more organized 
and strategic than it actually was. 
 In reality, during King’s tenure the organization was constantly plagued by 
budgeting and funding problems, even though King could command upwards of 
$10,000 dollars for a single speaking engagement long before he reached the 
height of his fame.5  If Montgomery, Selma, and Birmingham created a positive 
impression of the efficacy of SCLC’s operations, it was due in part to the 
organization successfully co-opting work being done by other civil rights groups, 
especially the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC).  In the instances of Albany, GA, and St. 
                                            
4
 Martin Arnold, “Rights March on Washington Reported Growing,” New York Times, August 4, 
1963, 57. 
5
 Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America. 70 
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Augustine, FL, the failures of SCLC’s campaigns were quietly overlooked due to 
the fact that they took place on a smaller scale in smaller towns, and also that 
they were immediately preceded by more successful action in cities that had 
received attention in the national press.  Albany was overshadowed by a quick 
shift of focus to Alabama, followed thereafter by King’s “Letter from Birmingham 
City Jail;” St. Augustine, by the “Freedom Summer” of 1964.6 
 The campaign most salient to understanding the failures of the PPC, and 
the one that will be examined most fully in this work, is the Chicago Freedom 
Movement wherein SCLC aimed to wage a “War on Slums” in Chicago.  
Although it endured for nearly a year and a half, the campaign never achieved its 
goals of desegregating and improving public housing in that city, despite the 
involvement of the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO), 
which had previously experienced some success in leveraging nonviolent direct 
action in protest of certain policies enforced by the Chicago Board of Education.  
The Chicago campaign came at a crossroads in King’s life and at a time when 
SCLC was struggling to make itself relevant as calls for “Black Power” and more 
militant solutions for the cause of civil rights were gaining traction across the 
North and the South.  Also worth examining in this context is the role that 
Operation Breadbasket (a program designed to address job discrimination by 
increasing employment opportunities for blacks, especially in companies where 
they were major consumers) played in the Chicago campaign.  It is no 
                                            
6
 I would be remiss if I did not mention the invaluable chronological resource of the “Daily 
Journal,” part of the King Online Encyclopedia, an online resource provided by The Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Research and Education Institute at Stanford University (SU), http://mlk-
kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/chronology_contents?category=daily. 
 6 
coincidence that Operation Breadbasket was both one of the most successful 
SCLC initiatives and one of the few that functioned largely independent of 
SCLC’s formal structure. That Operation Breadbasket achieved its goals despite 
its association with SCLC puts into sharp relief the organization’s inability to 
administer the Poor People’s Campaign. 
 
Methodology 
 The inspiration for this area of research came from a brief entry on Martin 
Luther King that I wrote for Dwight Burlingame’s three-volume work Philanthropy 
in America: A Comprehensive Historical Encyclopedia.  SCLC has been a 
501(c)(4) since 1962 and although it was one of the premiere nonprofit 
organizations to operate during the civil rights era, far less attention is paid to 
SCLC in academic literature when compared to the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) or the National Urban League (NUL), 
both of whose national offices are 501(c)(3)s.7  I wanted to find out what it was 
that set SCLC apart as a social welfare nonprofit and why I never read about it in 
the broader context of discussions of civil society in the 1960s.  As I learned 
more about the organization I discovered how the Poor People’s Campaign 
signaled the beginning of the end of SCLC and that the efficacy of the PPC was 
compromised by the structural issues that had plagued the organization for over 
a decade. 
 As a scholar of philanthropic studies, my approach to the historical 
aspects of this topic is different than that of a typical historian.  I focus heavily on 
                                            
7
 See Guidestar.org’s listings for each organization’s status and ruling year. 
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those aspects of SCLC that relate specifically to its activities as a nonprofit 
organization, including board governance, tax exempt status, and adherence to 
its stated mission.  In doing so, I occasionally choose to limit the amount of 
historical context given to certain persons, places, and events within the body of 
the thesis.  In those instances, the reader will find additional contextual 
information and suggestions for further reading in the footnotes.  This is in no 
way meant to diminish the historical importance of these instances, but rather to 
maintain focus on my core argument surrounding SCLC’s decisions as a 
nonprofit organization. 
 My research, however, led me to examine a broad swath of sources both 
philanthropic and historical, beginning with primary material from the archives of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.  Both 
are housed at The King Center in Atlanta, GA, but fortunately for researchers 
The King Center Imaging Project went live in early 2012, making over one million 
documents related to King’s life and work accessible in digital format. I then 
discovered that a copy of the SCLC archives also exists at the Georgetown Law 
Library, where I was able to examine them in their entirety on microfilm.  Other 
primary sources include documents issued by the executive and legislative 
branches of the federal government; edited volumes containing contemporary 
essays on the topics of poverty, race, and civil rights; and first-hand accounts of 
SCLC and the PPC published in newspapers and periodicals. 
 Comparing and contrasting biographies of King was also an invaluable 
research tool.  King is a complex, towering figure of 20th century history and the 
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manner of his death caused many writers to cast an uncritical eye on his 
accomplishments and failures.  Consequently, very little attention has been paid 
specifically to his role as the head of SCLC.  As Adam Fairclough argues, “Even 
the best biographies offer little insight into SCLC, giving only a superficial glance 
at King’s organizational base.”  Never mind that the PPC is often relegated to a 
mere footnote in shorter accounts of King’s life. 
 
Gaps in the Literature 
 In all of these works I could find no comprehensive examination of the 
PPC as a product of a social welfare nonprofit.  Some accounts include only 
those parts of the campaign planned for and carried out under King’s tenure with 
SCLC.  Others consist largely of journalistic observations or later recollections of 
participants, with little or no mention of the history of SCLC.  A great number of 
academic monographs on poverty and civil rights omit any mention of the 
campaign altogether.  By failing so completely, the PPC had seemingly wiped 
itself from the historical record, along with any reason to consider SCLC’s role in 
the civil rights movement after King’s death. 
 For nearly two decades, scholarship virtually ignored the PPC or refused 
to acknowledge how little the Abernathy-era SCLC accomplished as compared to 
the work of other civil rights nonprofits, particularly as the sector transitioned from 
the nonviolent direct action of the late 1960s into the Black Panther Movement of 
the early 1970s.  Not until David J. Garrow’s Pulitzer Prize winning tome Bearing 
the Cross was published in 1987 did a comprehensive examination of King’s life 
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through the lens of SCLC exist.  One year later Adam Fairclough’s To Redeem 
the Soul of America provided additional context for understanding the 
organizational structure of SCLC and its effect on the PPC.  I draw heavily upon 
the research presented in both of those books. 
 Equally important to my research is the body of literature on mid-20th 
century poverty both from contemporary and historical perspectives.  The PPC 
should sit squarely at the nexus of discussions on poverty and civil rights, yet it is 
rarely discussed in the context of the Great Society or similar political movements 
designed to address the needs of the poor in the United States.8  I believe this is 
because the campaign was the product of a formal nonprofit, and neither a 
government initiative nor a community- or grassroots-based movement led 
directly by those it was designed most directly to affect: namely, the poor. I 
examined a wide variety of scholarly essays on the topic, paying special attention 
to critical assessments of the Johnson Administration’s War on Poverty.9 
 
Scope 
 Although the source material is vast and the topic infinitely interesting, I 
have chosen to limit my research by focusing narrowly on King’s and SCLC’s 
activities on the topics of poverty and economic inequality.  I will include 
                                            
8
 Key works consulted for this thesis include Todd DePastino, Citizen Hobo: How a Century of 
Homelessness Shaped America; Louis A. Ferman, Joyce L. Kornbluh, and Alan Haber, “Poverty 
in America;” Jennifer Frost, “An Interracial Movement of the Poor:” Community Organizing and 
the New Left in the 1960s; Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States; 
Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How 
They Fail; Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty. 
For full information on each, please see the bibliography. 
9
 James L. Sundquist’s edited volume of essays in On FIghting Poverty: Perspectives from 
Experience proved especially crucial in understanding the first few months leading up to the 
implementation of the War on Poverty, in addition to the first year of its existence. 
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discussions of King’s views on Vietnam, SCLC leadership’s interaction with the 
Johnson administration, and the activities of other civil rights groups during the 
same time period only as they directly relate to the creation and execution of the 
Poor People’s Campaign.  I do not delve into campaigns by organized labor or 
for welfare rights, the activities of the New Left and Black Power movements in 
the period leading up to King’s death, the controversies surrounding FBI wiretaps 
and charges of Communism against the organization and its supporters, or the 
participation of other minority groups in the PPC.  
 In order to fully understand how King and SCLC arrived at the crucial 
decision to carry out the Poor People’s Campaign, I needed to trace the history 
of SCLC back to its founding in 1957 as the “Southern Leadership Conference on 
Transportation and Non-Violent Integration.”  Chapter two offers a brief history of 
the creation of SCLC and how its early directives were generated as an 
outgrowth of the work of the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA).  This 
chapter also examines King’s appointment as the head of SCLC and the way in 
which the original leadership team formed around him in response to his sudden 
presidency. 
  Chapter three takes a close look at the organization’s mission and by-
laws in order to understand how that founding document informed SCLC’s 
decision-making processes in its early years.  In the wake of Montgomery, the 
young organization struggled to find its place in the civil rights movement, with 
campaigns such as the Crusade for Citizenship failing to achieve stated goals.  
This chapter examines how early organizational shortcomings in public relations 
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and fundraising laid the groundwork for larger operational problems in SCLC as 
the 1960s progressed. 
 Chapter four takes an in-depth look at SCLC’s structure and how 
weaknesses in staff relations and communication, tensions with SCLC affiliates 
and other nonprofit organizations, and--after Selma and the March on 
Washington--the ascendency of King as the leader of the civil rights movement 
created an environment of organizational uncertainty and dysfunction.  In the 
space of less than a decade SCLC had gone from being an organization that 
focused on inequalities in busing, retail and to a lesser extent education in select 
cities in the south, to one that emphasized a broader need for voter registration, 
and finally to one that operated on a national scale, with the aim of economic, as 
well as racial, equality.  Tracing that organizational trajectory is essential to 
understanding why the PPC was a natural extension of SCLC’s mission as the 
1960s drew to a close. 
 This work will then devote significant time to the organizational decisions 
made by the SCLC from early 1967 until the summer of 1968.  The organization 
had begun the Chicago Freedom Movement in the summer of 1965 and ended 
that campaign in December of 1966. The months immediately following were a 
period of reflection for King and ones in which SCLC’s staff retreats and King’s 
own sermons reflect his growing belief that improving the economic situation of 
blacks was the key to garnering government support for the organization’s larger 
goals of racial integration and equal treatment under the law.  By the time of 
King’s assassination in April 1968, SCLC had already publicly declared the plans 
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for a mule train to Washington, D.C., and the creation of Resurrection City as 
part of the PPC.  Within just a few short months, however, the campaign was 
completely over. 
Chapter five discusses in detail the roots of the campaign in the “War on 
Poverty.”  It will illustrate how the Chicago Campaign affected the organization 
and inspired King’s decision to call for a Poor People’s Campaign, how the 
organization’s vacillating views affected its execution, and how SCLC ultimately 
decided to endorse the PPC and accept the concept of economic equality as 
crucial to the organization’s mission. 
 Chapter six illustrates that the reality of the Poor People’s Campaign fell 
far short of the SCLC’s expectations for it, and how Abernathy’s leadership failed 
to rally both internal and external supporters to the cause. With ten years of 
experience upon which to draw, SCLC should have been able to carry out King’s 
final campaign without him.  Low turnout and the constant threat of violence in 
Resurrection City were anathema to King’s vision of mass, nonviolent direct 
action; thus, the campaign was never able to gain enough momentum to affect 
real change.  This chapter also includes an examination of reporting on the 
campaign in the mainstream and black presses, with an emphasis on the fact 
that many of the conflicts among SCLC staff and PPC participants were played 
out on a national stage by virtue of occurring in plain view of reporters and 
supporters. 
 In chapter seven I offer an assessment of the failures of the Poor People’s 
Campaign by way of examining how the leadership of SCLC was unable to 
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respond to organizational change and adapt the campaign accordingly.  This 
chapter will also include observations on how the mismanagement of the PPC 
signaled larger problems for the organization, which led to its decreasing 
influence in the civil rights movement and eventually its demise.  This chapter 
asks “Why Failure?” and includes an in-depth assessment of SCLC’s struggle to 
obtain tax-exempt status as a 501(c)(4) organization as a prime example of how 
the organization’s leadership allowed or outright created barriers to its success.  
This chapter closes with a brief examination of SCLC’s successful campaigns 
and how the organization could have learned more from those experiences. 
 Chapter eight begins with a brief summary of how the civil rights and anti-
poverty movements were weakened by the start of the 1970s and how the PPC 
was a harbinger of those changes.  I offer up three specific suggestions for future 
scholarship as well.  I also hope to reveal how King’s legacy was shaped by the 
PPC and how SCLC’s decision to address the issue of economic inequality 
directly had far-reaching implications, even laying the groundwork for mass 
protests such as the recent Occupy Movement.  Ultimately, though, I hope to 
shed some light on the limitations of nonprofit organizations to affect change 
using a top down approach in an attempt to mobilize a loose coalition of 
constituents, in this case “poor people,” and the conclusion addresses the topic 
of power and its implications for the sector as a whole.  Absent the necessary 
structure required to impartially examine an organization’s objectives and its 
ability to carry out its stated mission, leadership can become incredibly short-
sighted and willing to agree to engage in activities that are neither in the best 
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interest of the organization nor those it is designed to serve.  Indeed, without the 
input and support from those who are the intended beneficiaries, initiatives like 
the Poor People’s Campaign are doomed to fail.
 15 
CHAPTER TWO: HOW SCLC CAME TO BE 
 
Buses, Boycotts, and Citizenship 
 SCLC began as outgrowth of the MIA, a loose coalition of black leaders 
who had come together in the wake of Rosa Park’s arrest on a Montgomery, 
Alabama, bus and the almost immediately called for a bus boycott.  King was 
chosen as the organization’s president during the association’s first leadership 
meeting on December 5, 1955.10  The MIA had three main goals: better 
treatment of black riders by white bus drivers, the seating of passengers on a 
“first come-first served” basis, and the hiring of black drivers on “predominantly 
Negro routes.”11  The MIA rallied mass meetings, organized carpools, and 
successfully kept nearly 40,000 black passengers from patronizing the bus 
system during the boycott’s first six months.12  In an address to the 47th NAACP 
National Convention on June 27th, King attributed the strength of the campaign, 
and the strength exhibited by those who were participating in the boycott, was 
owed to “a basic philosophy undergirding the movement.  It is a philosophy of 
non-violent resistance.”13 
 As the boycott continued throughout the summer and into the fall, King 
traveled extensively to a number of speaking engagements in the South 
designed to rally support for the MIA’s efforts in Montgomery.  In his “Address to 
                                            
10
 Garrow, Bearing the Cross, 51. 
11
 Wayne Phillips, “Montgomery Negroes Tell Court of Abuse by City’s Bus Drivers,” New York 
Times, March 22, 1956, 20. 
12
 “New Letter from M.I.A.” Vol 1, No. 1, ed. Jo Ann Robinson. SU, accessed 3/20/12, http://mlk-
kpp01.stanford.edu/primarydocuments/560607_001.pdf. 
13
 “Address by MLK at 47th NAACP Annual Convention,” June 27, 1956, 7, KCDL, accessed 
3/29/12, http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/address-mlk-47th-naacp-annual-
convention. 
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the First Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) Mass Meeting” King made 
clear that the approach to the boycott was manifold: “Not only are we using the 
tools of persuasion, but we’ve come to see that we’ve got to use the tools of 
coercion.  Not only is this thing a process of education, but it is also a process of 
legislation.”14  In November 1956, the MIA could claim a clear victory on the 
legislative process when the Supreme Court issued a mandate declaring the 
segregation of buses in Montgomery unconstitutional, upholding an earlier 
decision by an Alabama federal district court that stated in part, “We hold that the 
statutes and ordinances requiring segregation of the white and colored races on 
the motor buses of a common carrier of passengers in the City of Montgomery 
and its police jurisdiction violate the due process and equal protection of the law 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”15  
Once the MIA knew that all possible appeals to that mandate had been 
exhausted, a decision was made to announce the lifting of the boycott. 
 On December 20 King issued a “Statement by the President of the 
Montgomery Improvement Association,” a letter imbued with his Christian faith 
which explains King’s belief that the boycott was more than just a refusal to ride 
the buses; it was a movement.  And with that, the ban was lifted: “In light of this 
[Supreme Court] mandate and the unanimous vote rendered by the Montgomery 
Improvement Association about a month ago, the year old protest against the city 
buses is officially called off, and the Negro citizens of Montgomery are urged to 
                                            
14
 Martin Luther King, “Address to the First Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) Mass 
Meeting,” A Call to Conscience: The Landmark Speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. eds. 
Clayborne Carson and Kris Shepard (New York: Warner Books, 2001), 12. 
15
 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 - Dist. Court, MD Alabama (1956). 
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return to the buses tomorrow morning on a non-segregated basis.”16  King closed 
the statement with a letter of caution, encouraging black riders to continue to 
adhere to non-violent principles and to hold no ill will to their fellow white riders.  
The day before the statement, the MIA had distributed a flyer on “Integrated Bus 
Suggestions” that contained one suggestion in particular that stood out from the 
rest: “8. According to your own ability and personality, do not be afraid to 
experiment with new and creative techniques for achieving reconciliation and 
social change.”17  Whether he realized it or not, King had penned a suggestion 
that would apply to his work in the civil rights movement for the remainder of his 
life. 
 
Building the Leadership 
 In just 381 days, King had established himself as a charismatic leader 
capable of leading a movement based on the principles of nonviolent direct 
action.  The boycott had also garnered the attention of other powerful actors in 
the civil rights movement, including Bayard Rustin, a figure of some controversy 
owing to his former affiliation with the Communist party and his widely known 
homosexuality.  Rustin had supported the boycott and at its close brought a 
group of his closest friends to Montgomery to consult with him on the goal “of 
using the Montgomery movement as the basis for a wider civil rights initiative 
                                            
16
 The Rev. M. L. King, Jr., “Statement by the President of the Montgomery Improvement 
Association,” December 20, 1956, KCDL, accessed 3/30/12, 
http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/statement-president-montgomery-improvement-
association. 
17
 The Rev. M. L. King, Jr., President and The Rev. W. J. Powell, Secretary, “Integrated Bus 
Suggestions,” December 19, 1956, KCDL, accessed 3/30/12, 
http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/mlk-flyer-integrated-bus-suggestions. 
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across the South.”18  It was Rustin and these northerners, white as well as black, 
who championed the idea of a broader transportation conference, to be led by 
King and other leaders from across the South; Rustin would contribute by 
drafting a series of “working papers” to facilitate discussion.19  The planning and 
execution of this first meeting set a pattern for how SCLC determined nearly all 
future actions: although input and feedback from both black and white 
northerners was solicited and incorporated into the decision making process, it 
was ultimately SCLC’s black leaders, mostly Southern, mostly preachers, who 
wielded the most power and had the final say.20 
 The heads of the MIA convened the Southern Leaders Conference on 
Transportation and Non-Violent Integration in January 1957, with the goal of 
capitalizing upon the momentum of the bus boycott and transforming that energy 
into a bigger campaign.  Attendees drafted “A Statement to the South and 
Nation” in which they “call upon all Negroes in the South and the nation to assert 
their human dignity” and understand that “non-violent resistance transforms into 
strength and breeds courage in face of danger.”21  With those sentiments, the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, a name that would not be formally 
adopted until August of that year, established its mission.  The eight working 
papers covered the usual topics of bus integration and non-violence.  But they 
also covered two new areas for this group, voter registration and “economic 
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sharing,” and included the names of two outsiders: C.K. Steele of Tallahassee 
and Fred L. Shuttlesworth of Birmingham.22  King was expanding his circle of 
supporters and on February 14th at the second meeting of the transportation 
conference, held in New Orleans, they elected him President.23  He was now 
head of a formal nonprofit organization with the stated mission of “helping the 
American Negro attain first class citizenship by NON-VIOLENT direct action and 
education.”24 
Six months later the conference convened for its third meeting, this time 
returning to Montgomery, at which time the group officially changed its name to 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, a change that King insisted upon 
in order to emphasize the role religious leaders had played in the movement thus 
far and the need to continue to garner support from black churches.25  The 
organization quickly set out to address the problem of the extremely low number 
of blacks who were registered to vote.  A “Crusade for Citizenship” was the first 
major initiative of the organization and had an ambitious goal of registering two 
million black voters by the 1960 election.26  The voter registration campaign 
started out slowly as King and SCLC leaders found their footing among the other 
civil rights organizations already addressing the issue of voter registration in the 
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South.27  In a memorandum dated February 4, 1958, King announced that the 
crusade would officially begin on February 12 of that year and made a point of 
stating, “The Crusade is not in conflict with the NAACP’s wonderful work or that 
of any established local groups.”28  The campaign, however, fizzled out, falling far 
short of the ambitious registration goal set forth in the fall of 1957 and raising 
only about a quarter of of the $200,000 budgeted to carry it out.29  The entire 
incident merited minor attention in The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr. , 
an edited volume published by King’s estate thirty years after his death.30 
 The leadership of SCLC realized that if it was to succeed, they needed 
better funding and a more focused mission.  Not until 1963’s Birmingham 
campaign would SCLC find sure footing as a nonprofit organization effective at 
mobilizing local citizens, garnering the attention of the national press, and 
engaging with powerful political figures in support of a cause.  Before all of that, 
though, King indicated his hopes for the future of the civil rights movement, and 
by extension the work of SCLC, near the end of his first book, Stride Toward 
Freedom: The Montgomery Story (1958): 
The nonviolent struggle, if conducted with the dignity and courage 
already shown by the people of Montgomery and the children of 
Little Rock, will in itself help end the demoralization; but a new 
frontal assault on the poverty, disease, and ignorance of a people 
too long ignored by America’s conscience will make victory more 
certain. 
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In short, we must work on two fronts.  On the one hand, we must 
continue to resist the system of segregation which is the basic 
cause of our lagging standards; on the other hand we must work 
constructively to improve our standards themselves.”31 
 
With this, King had begun to identify the conditions in which southern blacks lived 
as a source of their struggle for equality.  The next step was to make sure 
SCLC’s structure and strategy were equipped to address those problems.
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CHAPTER THREE: FINDING ITS FOOTING 
 
Building Support 
 In 1957 the Constitution and By-Laws of the SCLC were published in 
pamphlet form, declaring that “the Southern Christian Leadership Conference is 
established, dedicating itself to justice, refusing to cooperate with evil, appealing 
to the conscience of man, and working for social change but always in a spirit of 
good will and non-violence.”32  Those were lofty, if vague, goals to be sure, but 
this document also set forth specific limitations on the organization in the form of 
which states it would operate in at first (all southern), the type of membership it 
would have (affiliate based, not individually based), and term limits for the 
Executive Board (three years).  Of note is this description of the organization, 
offered under Article I, Section 3 of the By-Laws: 
The objects and purposes of said Corporation are to exist and 
function as an eleemosynary organization, and more particularly to 
organize and maintain Christian guidance to aid in improving the 
Civic, Religious, Economic, and Cultural Conditions in the South 
and in the Nation...This organization hopes to achieve its purposes 
through non-violent direct action, lectures, dissemination of 
literature and other means of public instruction.”33 
 
This is possibly the only time an SCLC publication used the word “eleemosynary” 
when describing the organization; perhaps the word was used in this instance 
due to its association with the concept of charitable alms, and in that way is a 
nod to the Christian aspect of the organization’s purpose.  Later SCLC 
publications favor the term “nonprofit, non-sectarian,” while academics and 
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journalists, if they offer a modifier at all, often describe the SCLC as a “civil rights 
organization.” 
 One section of the By-Laws jumps out as having long-term negative 
consequences for the organization: the reliance on dues from affiliates as a main 
source of income.  Fairclough argues that “without any dues-paying members or 
a systematic fundraising program, SCLC depended upon the black church for the 
bulk of its income.”34  That assertion is borne out by King’s correspondence with 
the 25-member Executive Board during SCLC’s early years.35  In letters sent to 
invite Board members to the December 1958 board meeting, King included “a 
personal request” that the board member “put the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference in your [the church’s] budget for as large an amount as possible.”36  
Even his own father received that request.  The larger fundraising issue for the 
organization, and one that would plague it long after King’s death, was that its 
financial health was directly correlated with its ability to leverage public relations 
and the media.  No doubt it is perfectly acceptable for a nonprofit to benefit 
monetarily from positive press and increased public visibility via mass media 
(and, in the 21st century, social media) channels; in fact, most actively seek such 
opportunities and rely on the fundraising dollars generated by internal marketing 
and communications departments or external public relations firms.  SCLC was 
simply not one of those organizations. 
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 With the exception of the voting rights campaign in Selma in 1965 and 
possibly Operation Breadbasket, SCLC was consistently unable to be proactive, 
systematic, and strategic in creating press and fundraising opportunities for its 
own campaigns and initatives.  Only when the organization was responding to a 
crisis, as in Birmingham, partnering with more powerful civil rights organizations, 
such as with the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, or relying directly 
on King’s force of personality, was it successful in raising sufficient funds to fulfill 
the whole of its mission.  The organization’s responses to high-profile political 
situations, combined with failed campaigns in Albany, St. Augustine, Mississippi, 
and Chicago, made for disastrous, repeated instances of negative press, 
resulting in spontaneous fluxuations in staff, chronic budget shortages, and 
unpredictable organizational capacity.37  Time and again SCLC refused to learn 
from its previous failures.  And it all started with the Crusade for Citizenship. 
 
Victim of Success 
 In its earliest days, SCLC was able to overcome its lack of structure and 
income through sheer force of will: the massive success of the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott and the accomplishments of the MIA gave SCLC’s mission a sense of 
urgency and timeliness.  King was its undisputed leader, and his own rising 
profile in circles beyond the black church in the South played a key role in 
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lending credibility to the fledgling organization.  One of SCLC’s first events was 
the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom, held in Washington, D.C. on May 17, 1957. 
As Fairclough explains, “the Prayer Pilgrimage was a golden opportunity to 
project King as a national figure” and was created by SCLC, in coordination with 
the NAACP, to do just that.38  The rally yielded a disappointing crowd and 
attracted little press.  In his speech, however, King laid out the justification for 
SCLC’s first campaign, explaining that “all types of conniving methods are still 
being used to prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters.  The denial of 
this sacred right is a tragic betrayal of the highest mandates of our democratic 
tradition.  And so our most urgent request...is to give us the right to vote.”39 
 Fewer than five months later, in October 1957, SCLC released a “Press 
Statement Regarding Crusade for Citizenship,” in which the organization 
announced no less a goal than encouraging “every Negro in the South to register 
and to vote.”40  King also built upon the themes of unity and justice he had 
elucidated at his speech at the Prayer Pilgrimage rally by explaining that “we 
know that millions of white Southerns [sic] recognize the justice of our cause, 
appreciate the spirit of our method and stand four-square that the time has come 
when all Americans should exercise the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.”  
The proposed budget for the campaign was $200,000, to be spent in support of 
rallies in 20 different southern cities during a January 20 kickoff, and “a special 
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effort would be made to get the black press to publicize the January rallies.”41 
What the press release did not contain, and which was equally unclear to SCLC 
staff and supporters alike, was any mention of just how the organization would 
raise that money and accomplish the goal of full enfranchisement. 
 By January the campaign was already behind schedule, with the mass 
rallies postponed until February 12.  King issued a memorandum on February 4 
in order to ensure a “unity of aim and direction” for the campaign, including a 
revised goal “to double the number of Negroes who vote in the South.”42  While 
the crusade would focus on the 1958 and 1960 elections in particular, no 
deadline for doubling black votership was included in the memo.  In very short 
time, and by all objective measurement, the campaign was a failure, if it can even 
be said that it ever got off the ground.  The rallies were poorly attended and 
received little or no press, depending on the location; what little attention they did 
receive resulted in headlines such as one in Newsweek that read “Drive Lags for 
Negro Registration.”43  Just like that the Campaign for Citizenship, SCLC’s first 
campaign came to an abrupt, and abysmal, halt just nine months after it had 
been announced. 
 The organization’s public profile did not improve over the next two years.  
The Voter Education Project (a combination of five civil rights groups’ voter 
registration campaigns organized under the supervision of the tax exempt 
Southern Regional Council) and the demonstrations in Albany, Georgia, failed to 
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acheive meaningful outcomes or positive press weighed heavily on SCLC’s 
leadership.44  On top of that, King was required to maintin a blistering speaking 
schedule, speaking multiple times a day for sometimes weeks on end, in order to 
meet the budget required to run the organization’s operations.45 
In his 1962 “Report of the Director,” Wyatt Walker, the organization’s 
Executive Director since 1960, called Albany “a proving ground for SCLC.”46  He 
went on to claim that the organization “demonstrated that we have an 
organization that in a moment of national crisis has the personnel, the resources, 
the program, and the know-how to do a job with Madison Avenue efficiency and 
yet with the grass-roots touch.”47  Notably, he credited Albany doctor William G. 
Anderson’s appearance on “Meet the Press” and the CBS documentary 
“Eyewitness to History” as crucial to bringing attention to SCLC’s activities in 
Albany.  While Walker’s assessment of Albany was certainly far more positive 
than the reality there, his statement on fundraising painted a more accurate 
picture: “We honestly face the fact that our income this year was off page with 
budget demands. If we are to remain operative at the present rate, much work 
remains to be done in this area alone.”48  Two high-profile benefit concerts had 
yielded $15,000, but “very litle emphasis has been placed on fund-raising 
through our affiliates.”49  And although King’s speeches continued to bring in 
money, and the fledgling direct mail program showed promise, Walker closed this 
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section of the report by listing celebrity-driven events as the key to making up the 
deficit before the end of the year; no systematic, sustained method of fundraising 
was suggested to the Board at that time.50 
 Walker’s report also contained language that echoed an assessment done 
earlier in 1962 with the board and staff.  The “Board - Staff Consultation” resulted 
in eighteen “Specific Program Recommendations,” among them increasing 
affiliation fees on a sliding scale, creating a membership level for individuals 
living in communities without an affiliate, creating job descriptions of each staff 
member; and publishing a printed Annual Report.51  The report also identified 
“Education and Public Relations” as a “major problem area,” and “the 
development of a South-wide ‘grass roots’ organization” as a “major concern.”52  
Weaknesses in each of those areas would continue to harm the organization all 
the way through to the conclusion of the Poor People’s Campaign.  In a 
fundraising letter to Mr. Thor Anderson of Marble Collegiate Church on the last 
day of 1962, King presented the organization’s accomplishments from the 
previous year and closed by telling Anderson that the proposed budget for the 
next fiscal year was $233,000.00.53  King was severely underestimating the 
organization’s expenditures.  A little over a year later SCLC was spending nearly 
$50,000 a month and even the residual positive impact of the March on 
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Washington for Jobs and Freedom did little to improve the organization’s 
fundraising prospects.54 
 
Direct Fundraising 
 SCLC continued to believe that attempts at press-worthy events would 
translate into donations, but time and again these efforts fell flat.  Part of this can 
be blamed on the tactic of nonviolent direct action, which by its nature was the 
antithesis of the violent, vocal conflicts of the movement that made for compelling 
reading or viewing.  King was passionately and publicly espousing a radical 
approach to oppression and segregation that not only “calls upon its adherents to 
avoid external physical violence, but it calls upon them to avoid internal violence 
of spirit.  It calls on them to engage in that something called love.”55  That kind of 
response to provocation might be morally and spiritually superior, but it was also, 
as King had learned in Albany from Police Chief Laurie Pritchett, not the best 
means of getting the organization’s message across in the absence of a violent 
response from authorities.56 
 More than half a decade after its founding, the organization was still trying 
to recapture the magic and efficacy of the Montgomery bus boycotts through 
calls for mass meetings, mass demonstrations, or mass movements.  Such 
sweeping calls rarely went further than the Board room or translated well from 
paper to the streets.  Increasingly, the organization looked to garner press 
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attention through what might be termed publicity stunts.  At an executive staff 
meeting on January 23, 1963, the group recommended that the upcoming direct 
action program in Birmingham include the goal to “Recruit as many Board 
Members as possible to go to jail.”57  A similar recommendation for King to go on 
a hunger strike in the event of a southern filibuster of the civil rights bill in 
Congress never made it past the board.58  In the absence of an organized public 
relations program, what the organization really needed was an infusion of cash, 
and it needed it quickly. 
 When the organization was able to be strategic in its direct fundraising 
efforts, the success was tremendous.  A single ad in the New York Times in 
spring of 1963 netted $66,000.59  The direct mail program, managed out of the 
New York office, enjoyed similar results.  A September 18, 1964 report on the 
National Mail Direct Fund Raising program signed by Adele Canter (the program 
at that time was overseen by Stanley Levison) detailed a net income of over 
$117,000 in just six months.60  The staff had pursued a strategy, after a hiatus in 
which the previously limited direct mail campaigns had been dormant for some 
time, of auditing the current mailing list and buying new ones to increase the 
donor base.  The result was the opposite of the gimmicks proposed by the Board.  
As the report noted: “[These mailings] bring directly to the attention of at least 
600,000 selected persons a complete, well stated story of the work, aims and 
purposes of the SCLC and Dr. King in a way that does not come across in hastily 
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scanned, often garbled public news media.”  The key conclusion of the document 
deserves to be quoted in full: 
Impressive as the current year’s accomplishments are, and 
impressive as the forecast may be, two points are worth bearing in 
mind.  This method of raising money is not a new discovery.  
Hundreds of millions are raised annually by organizations of all 
kinds in this fashion. 
 
Two elements are necessary for success – (1) Consistent, 
competent, professional methods.  We compete with highly talented 
professionals and cannot survive with amateur methods. (2) The 
response to an appeal is based on the accomplishments and 
consistently effective activity of the organization making the appeal. 
If the organization’s public image is tarnished by unsound policies 
or tactics, its income obviously suffers.  While, on the other hand, if 
its policies are sound but it is not getting through to the public, the 
response also suffers.  It should be noted therefore, that the 
present successful results rest heavily on the exceptionally 
favorable image of Dr. King and the leadership role SCLC 
exemplified in its campaigns in Birmingham, Albany, Savannah, 
Montgomery and elsewhere.”61 
 
Although the direct mail report also casts a too-positive glow on the 
organization’s less successful campaigns in Georgia, it nonetheless makes a 
strong case of the need for the ongoing professional development of SCLC’s 
leadership as well as its operations. 
 King acknowledged as much in his 1964 Annual Report, read on October 
1 at SCLC’s convention: “Gradually we are attempting to deal with the problems 
of growth from an organization of 3 to one of 62 in a few years time. We have not 
yet mastered our job, but we are gaining in our pursuit of the kind of 
administrative excellence which a movement such as this demands.”62  King 
recounted that SCLC now operated 217 affiliates in 28 states and the District of 
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Columbia, that almost 100,000 new voters had been added to the rolls in the 
South, and that in just under two years Operation Breadbasket had added $2 
million in revenue to black Atlantans.63  An organization that had “presented a 
picture of confusion and drift in early 1964,” according to Thomas F. Jackson, 
appeared to be heading back in the right direction by the end of the year, with a 
renewed emphasis on voting rights, and a burgeoning focus on segregated 
housing and poverty as the roots of systematic discrimination.64  Due in no small 
part to the publicity generated by the Selma campaign, SCLC found itself in 
relatively good financial health by the middle of 1965.  When an exhausted King 
briefly pondered taking a year-long sabbatical during a Jamaican vacation, it put 
into sharp relief the organization’s continosly fluctuating fundraising efforts.65  
Garrow sums it up best by stating that “aside from the well-run direct-mail 
appeals...SCLC possessed no systematic source of funding beyond the 
substantial sums produced by King’s speaking appearances.”66  A lack of 
organizational structure meant that SCLC still relied far too heavily on King’s 
powerful personality and ability to draw a large audience as the sole sources of 
publicity and income.  An examination of the progression of SCLC’s 
organizational structure will show that a lack of stability and constantly changing 
staff roles created an environment of uncertainty and fear, especially as the 
mission evolved and the “problems of growth” became even more amplified.
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CHAPTER FOUR: STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS 
 
The Early Years 
 The original SCLC by-laws called for an executive board of up to 33 
members and between eight and 11 executive officers.  As for staffing the 
organization, “The President and the Administrative Board shall have the 
authority to procure such a professional staff as would be necessary to further 
the purposes of the Conference, and to outline and supervise their duties.”67  
Throughout 1958 and 1959, that professional staff consisted mainly of one full-
time person in the form of an Executive Director, a position held temporarily by 
Ella Baker, followed by Reverend John L. Tilly, and upon his failure by Baker 
again, that time in a full-time capacity until the appointment of Walker in 1960.68  
The barely three-year-old organization was having difficulties picking strong staff 
members, properly training them, and then retaining them for more than a few 
months at a time.  Baker continued to argue for the importance of “office rules” 
that would define staff roles and duties, a request that fell on deaf ears.69 
 When the board met in October 1959, it was necessary to take “a long, 
hard look at the organization’s direction,” resulting in the decision to reduce the 
number of board meetings and provide more focused support for Baker.70  King 
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and the board also decided that the time had come for him to leave his 
pastorship at Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery in order to live full 
time in Atlanta and split the pastorship of Ebenezer Baptist Church with Martin 
Luther King, Sr.  In a press release issued by SCLC on December 1, 1959, King 
declared “we must realize that our crusade for citizenship is also for integrity.  We 
cannot lay the whole blame for our short-comings upon those who oppose us.  
We must purge ourselves of internal jealousies, defeatism and criminal 
behavior.”71  Except for the part about criminal behavior, those statements could 
apply as much to SCLC as to the civil rights movement as a whole.  Baker felt 
overworked and underappreciated, affiliates were few and far between, and 
those who were actively engaged were often led by powerful local leaders who, 
as Fairclough explains, “might seek SCLC’s help, and they might invite King to 
address mass meetings, but they would not defer to him.”72 
 The public perception of the organization was turning negative, if even 
thought of at all.  King recognized some of the organizational shortcomings and, 
in light of the October board meeting and in anticipation of his move to Atlanta, 
he prepared the “Recommendations to Committee on Future Program,” a 
document outlining a brief list of immediate changes for SCLC.  A strong 
emphasis was placed on public relations and the issuance of a press release to 
let the public know that SCLC “is actually expanding its services.”73  In order to 
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accomplish that, King recommended that Bayard Rustin be hired to “start the all-
important job of presenting our organization more adequately to the public.”  
Additionally, the SCLC needed to start a newsletter, “to be mailed to at least five 
thousand persons,” an idea that echoes King’s recommendations to the board of 
the MIA in 1956 when he suggested decreasing the number of meetings, 
increasing the accountability of the finance committee, and creating a newsletter 
as ways to immediately improve the operations of that organization.74  With the 
MIA, however, the recommendations were more tactical, as the strategy of the 
organization was clear: to boycott the bus system until certain conditions were 
met.  The 1959 list of recommendations to SCLC clearly show that the 
organization was still struggling to define its mission.  Especially significant is 
bullet point number six, which concludes with this vague statement: “I 
recommend that we begin thinking of some of the other areas that should gain 
our immediate attention.”75  No further suggestion as to what those areas might 
be is included in the document. 
 The theme of the October 1960 General Fall Conference was “The 
Southern Struggle and the American Dilemma,” an apt topic because, as 
Fairclough points out, SCLC at this time was struggling with how to improve its 
“baffling structure” of southern affiliates and a national office in Atlanta.76  Despite 
the fact that in the early years black churches, church-related organizations, and 
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black civic groups constituted a majority of affiliates - and their members were 
often middle class - the organization was not reaching new audiences at a rate 
required to meet budgetary requirements.77 
The General Fall Conference instead focused on two main areas in pursuit 
of the theme: voter registration and the student movement.78  The emphasis on 
voter registration was no doubt a direct result of Wyatt T. Walker’s having joined 
the staff as Executive Director in July of that year and the hiring of Reverend 
Harry Blake as the first dedicated voter registration staff member.79  Walker was 
more focused than his predecessors, he had the luxury of an increase in staff 
member and a sizable budget, and was able to help get the Citizenship 
Education Program up and running.80  The emphasis on the student movement 
shows that the organization was perhaps still trying to identify “some of the other 
areas” of focus that King had recommended in 1959.  It was also response to 
Ella Baker’s having called a conference that resulted in the creation of SNCC in 
the spring of 1960, when she was still SCLC’s executive director.81  In many 
ways Baker’s creation of SNCC was a direct response to her disillusionment at 
the inertia of SCLC’s leadership.82  By contrast, the student movement had an 
“inclination toward group-centered leadership,” as she told the Southern Patriot in 
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May 1960.83  In any case, with SNCC only a few months old, it stood to reason 
that SCLC would be focusing on the student movement at that time, although the 
two organizations would eventually split over the use of non-violent direct action. 
Meanwhile, the dues structure continued to hamper SCLC’s fundraising 
and awareness efforts outside of the South, in addition to creating tension with 
another civil rights organization.  Not until the Chicago Campaign would SCLC 
have a true foot in northern civil rights issues and even then the idea of individual 
memberships was out of the question, as that would put the organization in direct 
competition with the NAACP, whose membership structure and emphasis on 
legal recourse for racial inequality were its two hallmark features and key points 
of differentiation from SCLC.  Since its formation, SCLC had taken great pains to 
avoid direct competition with the NAACP, with King, other SCLC leaders, and 
select SCLC affiliate organizations going so far as to purchase lifetime 
memberships in the NAACP as a show of respect.84 
 If SCLC had made any improvements in organizational structure and 
efficiency by the end of 1960, they were not apparent during the disappointing 
Albany campaign of 1961-62.  Poor planning on the part of SNCC and SCLC, 
combined with the failure of nonviolent resistance to goad Chief Pritchett into 
engaging in direct violence against the protestors, resulted in a city that was still 
as segregated after the campaign as it was before.85  In his concise, insightful 
account of the Albany Movement, Thomas F. Jackson notes that the strife 
between SNCC and SCLC was as much to blame as any internal organizational 
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issues, although certainly SCLC’s inability to prioritize any action beyond getting 
press coverage of King’s time in jail was a contributing factor.86  Unlike 
Montgomery, there was no clear target upon which direct action would be 
successful.  Jackson explains that “Most of SCLC’s leaders agreed that the 
Albany Movement’s diffuse goals prevented concerted pressure that might have 
won tangible, limited victories.”87  The organization was at that moment a victim 
of its own vague mission and the instant SCLC strayed beyond the previous 
years’ focus on voter registration it experienced the limitations of direct non-
violent action to affect change on multiple areas simultaneously.  Again, it was 
time for a reshuffling of organizational goals and structure. 
 
A “Benevolent Autocracy” 
 The year 1963 began with a reigning in of expenses and a focus on 
Birmingham, the site of their previous annual convention in September of 1962, 
for the next direct action program.  At a meeting on January 23, the executive 
staff decided to take back all credit cards from field staff, send statements out to 
those who still owed for travel expenses on those cards, and require that staff 
submit travel plans in advance, and report their long-distance phone calls to the 
finance office.88  Although the Albany Campaign had not claimed any significant 
victory or, more importantly, any positive press, the leadership felt that in 
Birmingham “SCLC can profit by and build on [the] Albany experience. 
(Birmingham can give new image of the power of nonviolence so much needed 
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at this time).”89  The result was Project C (for Confrontation), initiated at the 
behest of King’s former SCLC co-founder and colleague Fred Shuttlesworth.  
Having learned a few lessons from Albany, SCLC set forth six specific goals for 
Birmingham, most of them centered on the desegregation of public facilities and 
retail stores and equal employment opportunities for black residents.90  Over the 
course of several months, SCLC and Shuttlesworth engaged in a campaign of 
boycotts, jailings, mass meetings, and demonstrations designed to get the city to 
agree to their demands. 
 The campaign, and SCLC’s organization and management of it, was 
effective in that Project C started the process of desegregation in Birmingham, 
even if it did not occur as quickly and completely as SCLC had originally 
demanded.  In a paper of this length, a full assessment of the Birmingham 
campaign is not possible, but the scholarly literature on the topic generally 
agrees that the success of Birmingham was due as much to King’s and SCLC’s 
perception in the public eye as it was to the residents of Birmingham, at least in 
the days and weeks immediately following the negotiated settlement with the 
city.91  Later claims by Shuttlesworth and Walker that Birmingham directly 
brought about the 1964 Civil Rights Bill are harder to support.  As Fairclough 
rightly points out, it “did not reach the statute book until July 1964, and until 
Lyndon Johnson became president it looked doubtful that it would pass at all.”92 
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 This campaign did witness King coming into his own as a figure of national 
and even international renown.  Major newspapers covered the campaign and 
King’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail” was featured in the New York Post Sunday 
Magazine and The Atlantic Monthly, among other publications.  By the time King 
concluded his “I Have a Dream” speech at the March on Washington for Jobs 
and Freedom in the summer of 1963, his status as the leader of the civil rights 
movement was cemented.  King’s rising celebrity, however, came at a cost to the 
organization, as Wyatt Walker tendered his resignation just days after the annual 
convention in Richmond, due in part, as Diane McWhorter argues, to “the 
executive prestige he had lost when King refused to discipline the insubordinate 
Jim Bevel during Project C.”93  In another instance, albeit minor, of staff 
indignities, Abernathy was miffed at having received a hotel room inferior to 
King’s.94 
 Walker’s last “Report of the Director,” part of the 1963 annual report and 
also referenced in chapter three, closed with this entreaty to the conference 
attendees: “We need to call our attention repeatedly to the role of the 
President...It is recommended that the Conference express to our President our 
sincere gratitude for the great work that he does in the interest of SCLC.”95  
Walker also recommended providing a stipend for King, although it was expected 
that he would turn it down.  Later at the conference, Walker’s request for a pay 
raise would be denied and his position redefined from “executive director” to 
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“executive assistant.”96  After King refused his resignation Walker ended up 
staying with SCLC until the summer of 1964 and one of his last campaigns there 
was in St. Augustine, where he accompanied King, in the words of Garrow, “to 
bring greater order to SCLC’s typically free-wheeling efforts.”97  Walker tried to 
impress upon King the need for order, discipline, and schedules, in addition to 
establishing a clear chain of command among the field staff.  Walker’s advice 
went unheeded and SCLC ended up quietly slipping away from St. Augustine 
after the campaign there fizzled out.98 
 A number of changes occured in the organizational structure of SCLC in 
1964, including some attempts to better define the roles of the national office and 
affiliates.  The organization had been operated like a “benevolent autocracy” in 
the words of Fairclough: King was the undisputed leader and decision maker, 
and his overlapping circles of advisors, staff, and committees created a Venn 
diagram of never ending opinions, ideas, and demands.99  A document on 
“Suggested SCLC Organizational Structure” was circulated sometime in 1964 
after Walker’s departure and it established six departments: Voter Registration, 
Operation Breadbasket, Nonviolent Education, Citizenship Education and the 
Washington Office and Special Projects (including fundraising and public 
relations).100  Each department was to be headed up by a director, and each of 
those directors would report to the Program Director, who in turn reported to the 
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President.  Each department was to receive an annual budget and would be 
required to send a monthly progress report to their department head.  In short, 
the chain of command and accountability that Walker had tried to instill in the 
organization was finally beginning to be put into place, at least on paper. 
 The Selma marches gave SCLC the perfect opportunity to test out its new 
structure and make the most of an increased national office and field staff.  
Again, a detailed analysis of a campaign the size of that in Selma is beyond the 
scope of this paper, however, King sums up the impact of the marches from 
Selma to Montgomery best in his autobiography: 
When SCLC went into Selma in January 1965, it had limited 
objectives.  It sought primarily to correct wrongs existing in that 
small city.  But our adversaries met us with such unrestrained 
brutality that they enlarged the issues to a national scale.  The 
ironic and splendid result of the small Selma project was nothing 
less than the Voting Rights Act of 1965...We had a federal law 
which could be used, and use it we would.  Where it fell short, we 
had our tradition of struggle and the method of nonviolent direct 
action, and these too we would use.101 
 
While scholars debate a direct correlation between Selma and the Voting Rights 
Act, it was undeniable that SCLC was back in the national spotlight, but also due 
to King’s force of personality and due in no small part to the role that mass 
media, television especially, played in broadcasting the brutality of the 
segregationists. 
For one brief, final period, SCLC was able to translate favorable publicity 
into positive results, namely in the form of fundraising for the organization’s 
mission.  Between September 1964 and June 1965 the total income was over 
$1.5 million, much of that in small donations via the direct mail program in New 
                                            
101
 The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. Carson, 288. 
 43 
York.102  Staff size likewise grew, with field secretaries (another position defined 
in the “Suggested SCLC Organizational Structure” document) in every southern 
state but Florida and Tennessee.103  Despite being flush with cash, the 
organization still had no systemic way of sustaining that level of income, outside 
of King’s speaking appearances.  When King considered taking a year-long 
sabbatical in the summer of 1965, SCLC leadership, both staff and advisors, 
realized just how cash-strapped the organization could become in a short matter 
of time.  Stanley Levison suggested tapping into the fundraising power of the 
black church as “the question of an organized structure not dependent on him 
[King] becomes critically urgent.”104  That was not a radical idea, as King’s 
earliest letters to the board, the majority of whom were ministers, had included 
similar, albeit informal, requests for donations, as was shown in chapter three. 
 
Denial and Neglect 
 The 1965 ad in the The Afro-American "Some Important Fiscal Facts 
about the SCLC" shed little light on the organizations’ finances.  The pamphlet 
took pains to point out that King took no salary, that SCLC’s “administrative costs 
are well below the ratio regarded as standard,” and that their “fundraising is done 
in the most careful, economical fashion by our own staff and volunteers.”105  The 
ad contained no actual facts and would have done little to reassure donors had 
they known about SCLC’s problems with financial oversight, or the lack thereof.  
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But 1965 was not the year for any of those concerns.  At his address to the Ninth 
Annual Convention in Birmingham on August 11, King proudly stated that the 
“organizational growth and expansion” as well as an increase in professional staff 
from 75 to 200 and the resulting tripling of the budget as a result was owing to 
“the fine quality of our professional staff,” implying that expansion was carried out 
with “a minimum amount of growing pains.”106  The remainder of the address 
related the successes of various departments over the course of the previous 
year, and also hinted at the future of SCLC with sections on “Unemployment and 
Poverty” and the “Violence of Poverty.”107  The summary of the convention, 
published at roughly the same time, offered little additional insight into how the 
rapid expansion of the organization was being supported by additional structure, 
other than to say “While we have been engaged in expanding the staff we have, 
at the same time, worked at building the strongest staff possible. In this regard, 
we have added three people with doctorate degrees.”108  Again, the document 
provides little indication that SCLC had actually taken to heart the advice of 
Baker, Walker, or Levison in creating a strategy around organizational 
operations. 
 It should come as no surprise, then, that by 1966 the organization was 
dipping into its reserve fund in order to continue paying for existing programming. 
A January 21 memo from Abernathy to King recapped the latest executive staff 
meeting, wherein the staff learned of “the desire of the President that the body be 
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advised as to the financial condition of the organization and the desire that all 
department heads curtail their spending for at least two weeks, so that S.C.L.C. 
may not be embarrassed financially.”109  By then the Chicago campaign, to be 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, was off to a rocky start and the 
Summer Community Organization and Political Education project (SCOPE) was 
eating up $100,000 each month, and it was operating solely in the South.110  The 
memo admitted that the organization did not know what they were spending on 
each program and that project funds might not be going directly toward 
programming, as the amount of liquor being consumed by field staff was just one 
area of concern in the organization’s “financial policies and practices.”111 
 Other operational issues were being neglected as well.  Erma Burton sent 
a letter to the Steering Committee expressing concern “over the lack of control 
exhibited in the preservation of valuable historical materials pertaining to the 
organization.”112  Lillie Hunter wrote a memo to King and the executive staff 
regarding the lack of rules and regulations around the national office, although 
things were “gradually taking shape and are moving with a little more uniformity 
and coordination.”  The office, it should be noticed, had been in existence for 
nearly a decade at that point.  Things were not much better in the field, as a 
report from Grenada, Mississippi, in August 1967 illustrated.  The project director 
there expressed frustration at “the seemingly lack of interest by former SCLC 
staffers in implementing much needed programs” in addition to unreimbursed 
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expenses, a lack of economic research on the area, and a lack of operational 
expenses.113  In short, the Grenada project was “in a state of confusion.”114  King 
spending so much time in the north, especially Chicago, was doing SCLC no 
favors, as both that campaign and the organization itself were experiencing 
serious mission drift.  Voter registration was no longer the focus of the majority of 
organizational programs and newer projects like Operation Breadbasket worked 
well on a small scale but had yet to garner the attention needed to generate 
much-needed publicity and donations. 
 In July 1966 King penned a letter to several staff members telling them 
that they were being removed from the payroll.  He explained that in light of 
Selma, the organization had nearly doubled its capacity, but now found itself “in 
the embarrassing position of having to reduce our staff to it’s [sic] normal 
capacity,” as if the plan all along had been to maintain a certain number of 
“regular” positions.115  After the anticlimactic conclusion of the Chicago campaign 
and a backlash in the popular press against King’s antiwar speeches and 
sermons on Vietnam, SCLC in 1967 found itself adrift.  In two separate staff 
retreats that year King began to outline his vision for the next phase of SCLC’s 
work and mission.  On November 28 he stated “that we must formulate a 
program and we must fashion new tactics which do not count on government 
good will, but instead serve to compel unwilling authorities to yield to the 
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mandate of justice.”116  He believed there was still room for non-violent direct 
action in the struggle for equality, but that it must now “be adapted to urban 
conditions and urban moods,” a sharp change from the southern-focused work of 
the organization’s first decade.117  To accomplish these goals would require no 
less than “a radical restructuring of the architecture of American society,” and the 
primary recipient of that restructuring would be those living in poverty.118 
 King’s fervent beliefs in affecting societal change would not be enough to 
keep SCLC solvent in the immediate future, however.  A “Moratorium on All 
Expenditures” memorandum issued to all executive and field staff just one week 
later declared a three-week moratorium on all organizational expenditures 
beyond salaries, previous priorities, or emergencies.119  On December 8 a 
separate memo on “Expenditures and Reimbursement of Expenses” was issued 
to the Executive Staff and Steering Committees, letting them know of the all-staff 
memo, and describing a dire state of affairs both financial and organizational for 
SCLC: 
A review of our financial position and general expenditures reveals 
an alarming state of affairs.  Many field staff members are working 
without adequate supervision; they neither know who their 
supervisor is, nor submit reports to maintain contact with the 
Organization.  Many other staff members have been making 
unauthorized trips, staying in hotels and engaging in other activities 
which are neither authorized or in the interest of SCLC.120 
 
All department heads were immediately to oversee all expenditures and approve 
in writing only those related to the mission.  With morale low and finances even 
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lower, SCLC needed a campaign to reinvigorate staff and supporters and rally a 
national audience around its cause.  What the organization got instead was the 
Poor People’s Campaign.
 49 
CHAPTER FIVE: POVERTY AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
 
 Where did the idea for a Poor People’s Campaign originate?  Why did the 
topic of poverty emerge above all else for an organization that had been primarily 
focused on voting drives, boycotts, marches, and other traditional tactics of non-
violent direct action?  The basis of the PPC can be found in three different areas: 
the administration’s challenges in taking on the subject of poverty, the failed 
attempt by SCLC to engage in an impactful northern campaign on a massive 
scale, and King’s own changing beliefs on the interrelatedness of social and 
economic injustices, especially as viewed through the lens of his growing anti-
war stance.  These conditions combined to form a situation in which SCLC found 
itself growing increasingly inconsequential in a world of more militant civil rights 
organizations, unable to deal with the complexities of a society in which 
segregation was no longer the de jure way of life for millions who had previously 
rallied around SCLC’s causes, at least not legally after the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  SCLC needed to gain a broader base of support, especially 
financially, if it was to continue to remain solvent as well as relevant as the 1960s 
progressed. 
 
The Chicago Campaign 
 Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 State of the Union Address was remarkable on 
several accounts, not least of which being that it marked the first time the word 
“poverty” was entered into either the Congressional Record or The Public Papers 
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of the President.121  In declaring “unconditional war” on poverty, Johnson was 
poised to carry out an ambitious initiative begun under the Kennedy 
administration with an equally ambitious plan of new programs, offices, and 
research on a topic that many Americans knew, and lived, but rarely discussed 
openly in the political sphere.  The ramifications of such a program for the black 
community, however, were complicated and at some times contradictory.  The 
initial task force organized under Sargent Shriver, at the time a Special Assistant 
to President Johnson, went so far as to publish a memorandum entitled “Why the 
Poverty Program Is Not a Negro Program,” a tacit acknowledgement that the 
planners of the war on poverty were simply not equipped to grapple fully with the 
racial implications of the program, especially with regards to the problems of poor 
urban blacks, more specifically those in the North.122  As Adam Yarmolinsky, a 
member of the task force, argued in an essay on the topic in 1967, “In fact, the 
whole problem of the northern ghetto was still not seen in anything like its full 
depth and complexity...Negro poverty was thought about and talked about largely 
in the geographical context of the Deep South, and Black Power had not even 
been heard of.”123  The task force would go on formally to organize as the Office 
of Economic Opportunity (OEO). 
 Whether SCLC leadership knew specifically of the obstacles faced by the 
administration’s task force or ever read Yarmolinsky’s essay is unknown, but 
King’s attempt to engage the organization in a meaningful northern campaign 
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beginning in 1966 certainly makes sense when examined in light of the 
limitations of the war on poverty.  King chose Chicago as the site of this 
campaign not only because “it is clearly the prototype of the northern urban race 
problem,” but because the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations 
(CCCO) had already built “a united action program” designed to “call attention to 
the various sore spots in Chicago society.”124  The campaign would focus on 
substandard housing conditions by waging a “war on slums”; King and his family 
even took up temporary, and intermittent, residence in a tenement on the west 
side of the city.  SCLC staff and advisors had been torn on the decision to 
engage in a northern campaign, with members of King’s research committee, an 
informal group of intellectuals originally convened to educate King on current 
events, encouraging a continued focus on the South as well as continued support 
of the Voting Rights Act.125  The lure of the big city, and the huge number of 
urban dwellers who could be mobilized in support of the cause, however, was too 
strong for King to resist.126 
 SCLC and King made two crucial mistakes in engaging the organization in 
this campaign: they utilized similar strategies and tactics to those they had used 
in Selma and Montgomery, and they severely underestimated the power of 
Mayor Richard J. Daley’s Democratic political machine.  An undated, unsigned 
document in the King Archives entitled “An Evaluation of the Racial Problems of 
Chicago” explains that race relations in Chicago were far different than in the 
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South because, while racial segregation was undoubtedly a facet of daily life in 
that city, there was still “a political apparatus...through which Negroes can seek 
remedies, increase their political representation and maintain some degree of 
political influence in the Democratic Councils.”127  It became apparent that SCLC 
and CCCO’s Chicago Freedom Movement had perhaps not done its due 
diligence in researching what blacks in Chicago needed or even wanted, 
especially when it came to well-established institutions in the city.  The 
conservative members of the National Baptist Convention were represented by 
the powerful leader Dr. J. H. Jackson, who continually challenged the campaign’s 
tactics and aims, arguing “that the city’s government and certain private agencies 
have already begun making headway to eliminate the problems of the 
disadvantaged.”128  Likewise, slum dwellers as a group were far less inclined to 
engage in political action against authority than their poor Southern counterparts 
and were more likely to trust in the power of government and private agencies to 
look out for their best interests.  Fairclough explains, “As Bevel’s staff had 
discovered earlier in the year [1967], slum-dwellers responded to SCLC’s moral 
entreaties with apathy, cynicism, and sometimes hostility...many welfare 
recipients, public housing tenants, and city employees felt dependent on the 
[Democratic political] machine.”129  Consequently, a July rally at Soldier Field 
brought out 30,000 supporters, far short of the 100,000 SCLC had hoped for, and 
“well below the 57,000 persons” who had showed up at a similar event two years 
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earlier.130  The campaign dragged on throughout 1966, with marches for open 
housing consistently drawing small numbers and little progress being made 
through negotiations with the city.  King himself was too distracted to fully focus 
on Chicago as the April board meeting resulted both in a published statement on 
Vietnam that quickly garnered more press attention than any of the organization’s 
efforts in Chicago and in a staff divided both ideologically and geographically on 
the organization’s mission.131 
 An August conference bringing together representatives of the mayor’s 
office and a coalition of organizations and activists including SCLC, CCCO, and 
CORE resulted in the September creation of the Metropolitan Leadership Council 
for Fair Housing; it was charged with carrying out the tenets of the settlement 
reached by the group.132  The settlement and the work of the council was 
underwhelming to say the least.  In fact, Chicago CORE leader Robert Lucas 
called the council a “farce” just three months later.133  When King returned to 
Chicago in March 1967, the focus was centered more on Vietnam than on open 
housing.134  Manning Marable summed up the entire Chicago campaign best 
when, writing in Race, Rebellion, and Reform, he argued that “The meager anti-
racist concessions which King and other top aides, notably Jesse Jackson, 
James Bevel, and Andrew Young, were able to extract from ‘Northern 
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segregationists’ did not justify the financial and personnel expenditures of the 
long and hard campaign.”135 
 SCLC’s organizational structure was again in disarray by the beginning of 
1967, as staff facing strained finances struggled to maintain efforts in both the 
North and the South.  L. D. Reddick, a long-time supporter and sometimes travel 
companion of King’s, told King that “SCLC had better do some ‘purposeful 
thinking,’” and consider three particular topics: finances and fund-raising, 
organization and staff changes, and, most important, program content.136  At that 
time in the North only Operation Breadbasket fully delivered on its stated 
mission.  When speaking or writing about SCLC’s efforts in Chicago, King always 
summarized the topic by shifting focus to Operation Breadbasket, perhaps to 
make the campaign appear as if it ended better than it did, or to make it seem as 
if the organization had planned to transition the focus from open housing to jobs 
in Chicago all along.137 
 In June 1967 King wrote a direct fundraising appeal letter to an 
undisclosed list of “friends,” explaining that the “confusions of the past year” 
should not be held against SCLC, as its role “is clearly defined in the total effort 
for political reform and eradication of economic deprivation,” a marked change in 
mission from the voting rights and citizenship education programs of the past.138  
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This letter, which for the first time stated that checks could be made out to “SCL 
Foundation,” (a full explanation of the organization’s tax exempt status appears 
in chapter seven) clearly did not have the intended effect, as the financial memos 
examined in chapter four demonstrate.  At the same time King was issuing a 
moratorium on expenditures, he was preparing SCLC staff for the “Washington 
Spring Project,” an endeavor he had hinted at in his “Why A Movement” address 
to staff at their November 28 retreat.  “We’re talking about the right to eat, the 
right to live.  This is what we’re going to Washington about,” King explained; “You 
see, I don’t care if we don’t name the demand - just go to Washington!”139  As 
SCLC would soon learn, however, King’s enthusiasm and inability to fully 
articulate the demands of the PPC would nearly tear the organization apart and 
harm the campaign itself. 
 
Mobilizing for the Poor 
 The decision to focus on poor people was not entirely outside the scope of 
SCLC’s mission, nor was it out of character for King.  In his autobiography he 
recalls “I could never get out of my mind the economic insecurity of many of my 
playmates and the tragic poverty of those living around me.”140  A pamphlet 
published by the MIA when King was still president listed “Improvement of 
Economic Status” as one of the ten main concerns of the organization, with 
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finding and training for jobs as top priorities.141  In his 1963 speech at Cobo Hall 
in Detroit, he linked the violence of segregation with the inability to gain economic 
equality: “We’ve been pushed around so long; we’ve been the victims of lynching 
mobs so long; we’ve been the victims of economic injustice so long.”142  And of 
course, the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom was designed by a 
broad coalition of organizations to address matters racial as well as economic. 
 Perhaps no other document embodies King’s beliefs on the twin evils of 
racial and economic inequality better than his 1964 book Why We Can’t Wait.  
Although the majority of the book is dedicated to recounting the campaign in 
Birmingham and its immediate aftermath, the final two chapters include key 
insights from King with respect to the growth of SCLC and the direction of the 
larger civil rights movement.  King believed that “every social revolution 
simultaneously does two things: It attracts to itself fresh forces and strength, and 
at the same time it crystallizes the opposition.”143  Accordingly, the number of 
SCLC affiliates that year increased from 85 to 110, with the strength of the 
overall movement made possible only through the support of blacks and 
whites.144  Near the end of the book King makes a startling call for a Bill of Rights 
for the Disadvantaged, a stimulus package, to borrow a modern phrase, which 
would “be in the form of a massive program by the government of special, 
compensatory measures which could be regarded as a settlement in accordance 
                                            
141
 “Looking Forward: The Montgomery Improvement Association, Inc.,” undated. KCDL, 
accessed 5/14/12, http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/looking-forward-montgomery-
improvement-association-inc#. 
142
 King, “Address at the Freedom Rally in Cobo Hall,” A Call to Conscience, 68. 
143
 Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can’t Wait, (New York: Signet Classic, 2000), 108. 
144
 Ibid. 
 57 
with the accepted practice of common law.”145  The program was not designed to 
offer reparations, but rather to provide education and training that would lead to 
full employment not just for blacks but also for impoverished whites.  Notably 
King viewed the federal government and Executive Office not as obstacles to 
achieving economic parity but as the institutions whose support was most crucial 
to the program’s success.146  Although King did not directly pursue the passage 
of a Bill of Rights of the Disadvantaged, he became increasingly interested in 
how the socioeconomic challenges faced by poor whites and blacks alike, with 
the latter suffering from “a double disability” of racial discrimination as well as 
poverty.147 
 In a letter sent on December 4, 1967, King announced that SCLC “will 
lead waves of the nation’s poor and disinherited to Washington, D.C., next spring 
to demand redress of their grievances by the United States government and to 
secure at least jobs or income for all.”148  He goes on to explain, “SCLC decided 
to go to Washington because, if we did not act, we would be abdicating our 
responsibilities as an organization committed to nonviolence and freedom.”149  
The decision to engage in the PPC, however, was far from unanimous.  The staff 
felt unprepared to launch such a massive campaign on such short notice, and 
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was concerned about another failure in the wake of Chicago.150  King, sensing 
that his current staff felt they did not have the capacity to manage the PPC, 
sought to ameliorate their concerns by insisting that “we are planning a little 
more, and a little longer in advance than we have ever planned before.”151  To 
that end, on December 13 the organization issued a press release announcing a 
“complete reorganization of SCLC” and the appointment of former Freedom 
Rider Bernard Lafayette, Jr. to the newly created position of program 
administrator; Andrew Young was named Executive Vice President, and 
Rutherford assumed the position of Executive Director.152 In addition to bringing 
an outsider’s perspective to the organization, Lafayette’s appointment was clearly 
“an attempt to link the less militant SCLC with black youths in major cities,” as the 
Chicago Defender pointed out.153  It was a desperately needed infusion of youth 
to an organization whose Board of Directors comprised 53 members that 
consisted largely of old guard movement supporters and ministers.154  Lafayette 
was 27 years old at the time, just one year older than King had been at the start 
of the Montgomery Bus Boycott. 
 No project of King’s or SCLC’s thus far was quite as ambitious in its scope 
as mobilizing a constituency outside of its traditional geographic and 
demographic bases.  Boycotting buses required residents of Montgomery to find 
alternate means of transportation; they did not have to give up their homes or 
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their jobs to engage in direct action.  Even when faced with physical danger, as 
the Freedom Riders or the marchers from Selma to Montgomery were on 
repeated occasions, there was a community support system available to provide 
medical care, transportation, or otherwise to attend to the needs of the 
protesters.  What King was suggesting was to take poor people out of their 
homes, out of their communities, and away from every support system they knew 
and to trust fully that SCLC would provide for their physical, social, and political 
needs in the nation’s capitol.  A leap of faith would be required on the part of the 
participants, as well as the organization. 
 As the precise goals of the PPC remained unclear at the turn of the new 
year, King had publicly stated that a full list of goals would be announced in 
March, an internal document circulated in January elucidating a “Statement of 
Purpose” that read more like a motivational speech than a memorandum, as if 
the organization were attempting to justify to itself the need for such a 
campaign.155  Frustrations with “an economically oriented power structure” could 
only be addressed through the use of “massive energetic protest tactics” 
designed to “dislocate or slow down the functioning of a city without harming 
it.”156  The document neither makes mention of the preparation required for such 
large-scale demonstrations nor does it outline a strategy for achieving jobs and 
income for the poor who would descend on Washington.  An emergency staff 
retreat was called in mid-January to address the campaign and at that time 
Rutherford began to engage outside organizations for additional lobbying and 
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research support, beginning with the American Friends Service Committee 
(AFSC).157  King also reached out to his New York advisors for similar strategies 
and was met with open hostility from Rustin, who believed SCLC should be 
focusing on cooperation with labor unions to help achieve employment for the 
poor and that a campaign built upon a shanty town in the nation’s capitol would 
only lead to backlash from both blacks and whites.158  King, as he had many 
times before with his most trusted confidants, did not express personal 
dissatisfaction with Rustin, but conveyed disappointment on behalf of SCLC and 
the PPC.  Henry Wachtel, another New York advisor present at the meeting, later 
said that “He [King] felt let down, because he held you [Rustin] up so high.”159 
 
Building Momentum 
 Throughout late winter and early spring of 1968, the PPC continued to be 
more of a rhetorical device than a well-planned campaign, with King traveling the 
country to drum up support by appealing to the emotional side of audiences’ 
experience.  While he may have “translated abstractions and policy prescriptions 
into compelling images and promises of tangible benefits” as Jackson argues, 
what is unknown is just how many of those who volunteered to travel by mule 
train or otherwise get to Washington knew what to expect once they arrived.160  
Letters from potential volunteers to SCLC described in very personal terms their 
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desire for everything from medicine for children to land ownership to receiving full 
Social Security benefits as motivation for joining the campaign.161  Many 
individuals considered the PPC to be their only way of ever possibly affecting 
change in government.  SCLC’s supporters from other organizations, meanwhile, 
had been approaching the campaign in a far more strategic and critical manner.  
In a January 19 letter to King on behalf of the General Board of Christian Social 
Concerns of the Methodist Church, General Secretary A. Dudley Ward 
expressed concern that the D.C. SCLC President had been visiting various 
groups, demanding support for the campaign.  However, “He [the D.C. SCLC 
President] offers no details, goals or tactics to be used, and so far as we are able 
to determine, he is being turned down everywhere so far.”162 
 Weeks passed with little improvement in preparations for the campaign.  
At a February 11 staff meeting, King scolded a select group of high-level staff for 
failing to recruit what Branch calls “a legion of hard-core poor” and for exhibiting 
little enthusiasm for carrying out the work of the campaign.163  Two weeks later 
the AFSC, which was continuing to provide support to the research committee in 
preparation for the campaign, came to a similar conclusion, dictating a letter to 
King and Wachtel with the recommendations that SCLC would need to create 
“specific demands, articulated in relation to the power and response generated 
by the early stage of the campaign” and take “immediate steps to define a longer 
list of specific bills and/or executive actions and to ‘research’ the Washington 
scene in order to come up with a list of viable solutions to the problems of 
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poverty.”164  The organization would have been wise to heed such suggestions, 
as SCLC had yet to make a cohesive statement on the demands of the PPC, 
especially as they related to legislation and/or presidential action.  At that time, 
the campaign was less than six weeks away. 
 One week later, on March 4, SCLC issued a press release to announce 
that the campaign would be delayed by two weeks, so as to allow for the 
conclusion of the Cherry Blossom Festival and to coincide with the reconvening 
of Congress.165  While legislative specifics were still lacking at a lightly attended 
press conference, King finally offered a rough schedule of events, with visits to 
Congress to begin on April 22 while a mule train of 3,000 poor would 
simultaneously begin their journey to Washington.166  King acknowledged only 
that the demands of the campaign would be similar to those of the Kerner 
Commission Report, which had been issued on February 29, 1968 and called for 
an overhaul of the welfare system and a minimum income guarantee, among 
other recommendations.167  
 Support for the campaign had grown throughout February, and by early 
March a number of trade unions and religious organizations were helping 
mobilize volunteers and collect donations.168  By mid-March SCLC had convened 
a coalition of “53 non-Negro minority group organizations” in support of the PPC 
and publicly announced that “many” of the 3,000 participants had been 
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recruited.169  The momentum of the campaign had changed, at least publicly, but 
a troubling memo issued by Marian Logan, the Assistant Secretary of SCLC’s 
board, certainly cast doubts internally. 
 In her scathing memo, Logan warned King and members of the board that 
SCLC might actually do more harm than good to the cause of economic equality 
by engaging in the PPC, especially if the participants did not adhere to the 
principle of non-violent direct action.170  Additionally, she expressed her 
disappointment at the lack of organization in preparing for the campaign: 
Even if I were able to concede the desirability at how inadequately 
they have been planned.  Such Demonstrations, I believe, should 
have been preceded, several months in advance, by the most 
careful and skilled groundwork and planning by someone--from 
SCLC or elsewhere--in whose capabilities the movement has faith.  
Without meaning to criticize those in whose hands responsibility for 
advance planning has been vested, it does not appear to me, or to 
anyone with whom I have talked, that an adequate job has been 
done.171 
 
Logan’s admonishment stands in stark contrast to King’s earlier claims that the 
PPC was organized farther in advance than any other SCLC campaign.  Logan 
continued her memo by questioning whether the organization had been doing an 
adequate job of defining its mission for supporters and donors overall, and she 
then reiterated a list of proposed programs she sent to the board in August of 
1967, including job training and lobbying for acceptance of black skilled workers 
into unions.  King attempted for a week to get her to withdraw the memo, but 
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Logan refused.172  Privately, King expressed his own doubts about SCLC’s ability 
to carry out the campaign, going so far as lamenting to Levison “that from a 
public relations point of view and every other way we are in serious trouble.”173  
Levison managed to persuade King to stay the course, but SCLC staff members 
were likewise growing anxious as April 22 neared, with concerns about the health 
and safety of the participants foremost on their minds.  With nearly 10,000 
potential law enforcement officials waiting to be mobilized in response to 3,000 
participants, and no camp site selected by mid-March, those in the organization 
charged with carrying out the campaign had a right to be concerned.174 
 SCLC and King’s participation in the sanitation worker’s strike in Memphis 
only compounded the tension in the organization.175  Staff members openly 
questioned SCLC’s ability to manage two campaigns simultaneously, especially 
with expenses outpacing fundraising.176  After the March 28 march to Memphis’ 
City Hall disintegrated into violence, staff support for the PPC hit an all time 
low.177  On April 1, a confidential memorandum was circulated as a result of an 
all-day meeting among King, the executive staff, and a select group of outside 
advisors.  The memo instructed staff in no uncertain terms that both the Memphis 
and Poor People’s campaigns were still to be administered as planned.178  
Notably, the memo acknowledged that “as this is a particularly soul searching 
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time for us, communication among ourselves is perhaps more important than 
ever.”179  On a positive note, SCLC encouraged its staff to engage in open 
dialogue internally; on a negative note, the memo was also likely a reminder to 
staff not to speak to the press about internal strife. 
 Interestingly, a Washington, D.C., news conference called by King on that 
same day received different treatment in two major newspapers.  The Baltimore 
Sun declared “King is Resolute on Poor March,” while the New York Times 
stated “Dr. King Hints He’d Cancel March if Aid is Offered”; these headlines 
perhaps reflected the nation’s own ambivalence toward the campaign.180  The 
Times, in particular was far more harsh in its criticism of the campaign in light of 
the Memphis march, and other national and regional newspapers warned that the 
PPC could easily result in an outbreak of violence over which SCLC would have 
little to no control.181  SCLC staff remained divided on the wisdom of pursuing the 
campaign with Jim Bevel and Jesse Jackson, as Garrow explains, remaining 
“openly opposed” to it.182 
 Tragically, it is King’s assassination on April 4 at the Lorraine Motel in 
Memphis that can largely be credited with reinvigorating staff and outside support 
for the PPC.  Three days before King’s funeral, SCLC’s Washington office was 
“hard at work” preparing for the campaign, engaging volunteer committees, 
soliciting fund-raising from star athletes, and replying to condolence letters.183  
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Over $300,000 in donations flowed into the organization via an advertisement in 
the New York Times.184  Additionally on April 22, what would have been the start 
of the campaign, Abernathy announced a timetable for the mule train and “City of 
Hope” shanty town, the latter of which was to be built beginning May 13.185  On 
the surface, at least, it appeared that SCLC was going to be able to carry out the 
Poor People’s Campaign, even without its charismatic leader, without whom 
there would have been no campaign.  SCLC leaders quickly realized, however, 
that the years of neglect regarding organizational structure and strategy would 
create a situation in which the campaign was unable to meet even the most basic 
needs of its participants, let alone achieve the grand goals set forth by King.
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CHAPTER SIX: A NEW ERA IN LEADERSHIP 
 
Abernathy’s Ascension 
 By all measures, Ralph David Abernathy was unprepared to assume the 
role of SCLC’s president.  Abernathy was perhaps closer to the “real” King than 
any other SCLC staff member or advisor, yet that very closeness made it difficult 
for him to emerge from King’s shadow to build a strong, effective leadership team 
for the Poor People’s Campaign.  While an accomplished orator and well-
respected member of the civil rights movement, Abernathy was simply 
unequipped to take over leadership of a nonprofit organization in such a fragile 
state.  As Fairclough observes, “Abernathy’s misfortune was that he served King 
so selflessly for so long that he developed few of the qualities necessary for 
effective leadership of an organization like SCLC.”186  Abernathy had subsumed 
his own desires for King’s, and had little concept of how to manage the financial, 
organizational, and strategic challenges exhibited by SCLC in the wake of King’s 
death. 
 As early as spring 1965, King had brought up the issue of succession with 
SCLC’s board, surprising them with his recommendation of Abernathy, then 
treasurer, as the heir apparent.187  Many in SCLC’s leadership were taken aback 
by the announcement, not because of King and Abernathy’s personal 
attachment, which was obvious to all, but because King had never before 
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indicated that the organization create a plan in the case of his death.188  King had 
anointed Abernathy as his successor before, when both were part of the 
Montgomery Improvement Association.  In a undated draft of a column, King 
praised Abernathy’s leadership skills and indicated that he would be the perfect 
person to keep the MIA on course: “The new President, Rev. Ralph Abernathy, is 
a man of boundless integrity, inexhaustible energy and eloquent courage.  He 
generates the kind of inspiration which will be needed to hold the loyal 
cooperation of the other officers and the rank and file of the organization.”189  
Had that column instead been written one decade later about SCLC, it would 
have described perfectly the kind of leader the organization desperately needed.  
The Abernathy of 1968, however, was simply not up to the task, as the next few 
months would show. 
 On April 22 SCLC issued a press release in which Abernathy announced 
the new schedule for the PPC.  The campaign would kick off on April 29 when 
“Dr. Abernathy and about 100 poor people from throughout the nation and other 
national leaders begin presenting demands to government officials and 
Congressional leaders” for a period of three days.190  Next, a series of marches 
would take place throughout the first three weeks of May, and participants would 
camp out at the “City of Hope” in Washington until May 30, when the campaign 
would culminate in a mass march on Washington, to which anyone was invited to 
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attend.191  Abernathy’s plan hewed closely to King’s vision for the campaign, 
albeit with a modified timeline: Abernathy did not indicate that the encampment 
would continue indefinitely, as King had urged.  In a statement following King’s 
assassination, Abernathy hinted at his desire to achieve the goals of the PPC as 
quickly as possible, explaining that if Congress met the demands of the 
campaign and would “enact legislation at once that guarantees a job to all and for 
those unable to work a guaranteed annual income” then that would be a 
recognition of the immense tragedy of King’s assassination and “the healing of 
the nation’s wounds can begin immediately.”192  Perhaps Abernathy was using 
King’s death as an opportunity to pressure Congress to act upon the campaign’s 
demands without having to go to Washington; Abernathy must have known he 
was in over his head. 
 
A Muddled Campaign 
 Unfortunately, most of the records kept by SCLC regarding the Poor 
People’s Campaign were destroyed on June 24, 1968, when Capitol Police 
raided the shantytown - by then renamed “Resurrection City” - and evicted all of 
its inhabitants.193  The King Library Digital Collection contains just five documents 
dated after King’s death pertaining to the campaign.  Luckily, however, a large 
body of journalistic accounts exists that details the PPC.  Most scholars, if they 
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acknowledge the organization’s administration of the campaign at all, agree that 
it was a failure for both SCLC and those who camped out for weeks on the 
National Mall.  Popular opinion was divided, with black leaders such as Dr. 
Thomas Matthew, president of National Economic Growth and Reconstruction 
Organization (NEGRO), lambasting “the pie in the sky promises of the Poor 
People’s March” as nothing more than glorified government handouts that would 
“perpetuate slavery.”194  On the other side, Washington Post columnist Roscoe 
Drummond asserted that the poor should be welcome in Washington, as “They 
are not demanding the impossible nor the ridiculous nor the extreme.  They are 
demanding that private industry and Government at every level put a higher 
priority on wiping out poverty in the United States.”195 
 The treatment of the PPC in the black press was also consistent with that 
of the white press, with the Chicago Defender contributing a series of 
assessments focused largely on SCLC’s leadership struggles at the camp and 
throughout the organization.  Responding to the “rumors that the crusade was on 
the verge of becoming a massive flop,” an SCLC spokesman told the Defender 
on May 20, the first Monday after all of the caravans were scheduled to arrive at 
the camp, that Resurrection City residents had plenty of food, were working 
cooperatively to build additional structures on site, and were receiving adequate 
medical care.196  There was even a modicum of entertainment because “taxi cab 
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drivers are volunteering to take the kids on free tours of the city.”197  In other 
words, everything was going according to plan.  Only it wasn’t.  In the most 
comprehensive first-person account of the campaign, Charles Fager observed 
that SCLC was already struggling to maintain order at this early stage of 
implementation.  The biggest immediate concern was, as Fairclough sums it up, 
that “SCLC had given virtually no thought to the question of how Resurrection 
City ought to be organized and administered.”198  This assessment is borne out 
by Fager’s recollection that by the time Abernathy called a press conference at 
the site on May 17, there were still no showers on site and electricity reached 
only a few parts of the camp.199  Worse, SCLC was continuing a long-standing 
pattern of mishandling the press, with press conferences running hours late from 
the very beginning.200  The public relations situation soured so quickly that by 
May 17 “the disgusted reporters,” whose newspaper bosses had had little 
sympathy for the campaign in the first place, “would begin feeding them [the 
newspaper editorial staffs] the kind of copy they wanted,” that is, negative.201 
 And the negative copy flowed indeed.  On May 21, SCLC leadership 
announced a postponement of the mass march that Abernathy had originally 
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announced for May 30.  “We’re not ready.  We need more time,” explained an 
unnamed SCLC spokesman; Abernathy offered no comment to the press 
regarding the postponement.202  A day later the first group of protestors 
descended upon the Capitol Building, only to be turned away by Capitol Police 
for lack of admission credentials.203  On May 24, 18 protestors with the campaign 
were arrested near the Capitol, a mere fraction of those in attendance.  An SCLC 
spokesman explained to the press that the campaign was not prepared for mass 
arrest just yet, with poor communication among leadership staff contributing to 
such ongoing, less-than-impressive efforts.204  As Fager recounted, only three 
demonstrations resulted in arrests, with a total of fewer than 40 people arrested, 
with those arrests usually involving people not officially involved with SCLC’s 
demonstrations.205 
 A bigger problem was looming, however, as the physical conditions of 
Resurrection City deteriorated, especially after near-record-level rains soaked the 
National Mall in late spring.  Camp manager Jesse Jackson told the Baltimore 
Sun on May 25 that several dozen inhabitants would be re-housed in light of the 
ankle-deep mud in the camp, but that most were staying put.206  Five days later 
the camp was again deluged with rain.  This time Abernathy spoke to the 
Baltimore Sun, taking pains to point out to a reporter his own tent on the 
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grounds.207  SCLC leadership had come under increasing fire for leaving the 
management of Resurrection City to a handful of paid staff, augmented by the 
presence of 20 members of a “Temporary City Government,” led by City 
Manager Bertrand Ransome.208  Most of these men were unequipped to handle 
the increasing number of “dudes” (rowdy youth, many of whom were gang 
members) who were engaged in harassing fellow campers in sometimes violent 
confrontations.209  Marian Logan once again expressed her disgust with SCLC 
leaders after visiting Resurrection City and realizing that most of the staff had 
taken up residence in nearby Pitts Motel in relatively luxurious conditions.210 
 
Too Little Too Late 
 By the end of May, Abernathy realized the campaign was in serious 
trouble and not even the minor concessions obtained by NAACP lawyer Marian 
Wright from the Department of Agriculture or the well attended Mother’s Day 
March that Coretta Scott King led could give the PPC any significant measure of 
success against its goals.211  Abernathy attempted to ameliorate the dysfunction 
of the camp by appointing Hosea Williams to manage Resurrection City and the 
direct action demonstrations, reassigning Jesse Jackson to a vague position of 
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organizing “action cadres” at other cities around the country, with the intent of 
bringing these cadres to Washington if necessary.212  Andrew Young took pains 
to state that Jackson had not received a demotion, but the dissension among 
SCLC’s internal ranks was now playing out publicly.  A June 2 New York Times 
article further illustrated that reality, stating that staff were beginning to complain 
about Abernathy’s leadership, his lack of strategy, and his hesitation to engage in 
massive non-violent direct action.213  The reporter pointed out that “Disarray 
within the S.C.L.C. staff organization has been apparent here for weeks” with 
Abernathy “reacting to the criticism of his leadership with uncertainty and 
snappishness.”214 
 At the same time, Abernathy was attempting to gain a measure of 
control over the struggling campaign by asking Bayard Rustin to manage the 
“Solidarity Day” demonstrations scheduled for June 19, the date decided upon 
after the mass march was delayed from May 30.215  Not even Rustin could 
overcome the disorganization among SCLC leadership, however, and, after 
submitting his own list of demands for Washington to the ire of staff who knew 
nothing about the list, he resigned after only a few days.216  By mid-June SCLC 
leadership was virtually paralyzed by indecision and conflict.  Complicating 
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matters were the conflicts among the various minority groups represented in the 
camp, a situation that came to a head when Williams engaged in a shouting 
match with Reies Tijerina, the leader of the Chicano participants.217 
 Most damaging to SCLC was that all of these conflicts were taking place 
out in the open and in full view of the national press, undoubtedly inflicting 
greater organizational damage than any previous internal squabbles.  “The 
disorganization and violence of Resurrection City,” explains Fager, “combined 
with the embarrassing interethnic quarrels, grossly compromised the leadership’s 
image.”218  As publications like the Washington Post continued to promote 
headlines such as “Leadership Crisis Perils Poor March,” “Poor People’s 
Campaign in Chaos,” and “Confusion Obscures Poor People's Specific 
Demands,” the organization of the Solidarity Day march took a backseat to more 
pressing concerns.  In one bright spot, a number of churches around the country 
along with the National Council of Churches were organizing congregants and 
donations in support of the march.219 
 Remarkably, the march ended up mobilizing nearly 50,000 participants, 
a fraction of Abernathy’s original goal, but a respectable number nonetheless, 
and due in no small part to outside organizations mobilizing around the event.220  
Mayors from twenty-two cities - including New York’s Mayor John Lindsay - wrote 
a statement in support of Solidarity Day which stated, in part “We, the 
undersigned Mayors, feel it only fitting and proper that we publicly proclaim our 
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commitment to the goal of those who march tomorrow.”221  The Chicago 
Defender called it “a fitting tribute” to King, with Abernathy and other SCLC 
leadership joined again by Coretta Scott King.222  In the end, it was her words, 
not Abernathy’s, that left a lasting impression on the marchers and roused them 
to a standing ovation, as she concluded her speech in the same way King had: 
“Free at last, thank God almighty I’m free at last.”223  Abernathy spoke after her, 
but owing to the late hour and the dwindling crowd, his words made far less of an 
impact as Coretta King’s.  His speech pointed out a number of minor 
concessions the campaign had elicited from members of Congress in the areas 
of food stamps and the Head Start program.  Abernathy then called for members 
of Congress to do more: “This is not enough.  This is not going to satisfy the poor 
people in their campaign.  We are not leaving until he [Bertrand Harding, Deputy 
Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity] ensures a real voice for the poor 
in all of the poverty programs of this country.”224  After 61 minutes of speaking, 
Abernathy closed with a repetition of the phrase “Let my people go” and the lyrics 
of a Baptist hymn, which were met with brief but enthusiastic cheers from the 
crowd.225  Fager called the speech “more articulate and carefully organized than 
any of his previous sermons during the summer.”226  Perhaps Abernathy finally 
had enough distance from King’s death to begin to formulate his own strategy for 
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the organization, as he concluded by laying out six specific demands of the 
campaign: ending hunger, bad housing, and unemployment, with the addition of 
guaranteed incomes for those unable to work; adequate health care for all 
citizens; full equality of educational opportunity for all citizens; and an “end to 
violence and repression at home and abroad.”227 
 In the end, it was too little too late.  Resurrection City’s permit with the 
National Park Service expired on June 24 and SCLC leadership’s request for an 
extension was denied.228  Increasing violence within and without the 
encampment made Washington officials disinclined to continue to house the 
shrinking number of participants.229  On eviction day Abernathy made a 
statement to the press that campers would not leave voluntarily and that “No 
matter what happens to me or to Resurrection City, the Poor People’s Campaign 
will go on.”230  A few hours later, U.S. Capitol Police sealed off the camp, 
rounding up Abernathy and the remaining residents, all of whom were peacefully 
taken to jail; the clearing of the camp took just 90 minutes.231  What had begun 
as King’s sweeping vision of mass mobilization of the poor ended quietly under 
the demoralized leadership of Abernathy.  SCLC’s viability as an affective force 
for change in the civil rights movement was in question, as was its leadership 
structure moving forward.  The challenges of the PPC had put into sharp relief 
the organization’s now complete inability to fulfill its mission.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: UNDERSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE CAMPAIGN 
 
The Aftermath 
 A handful of additional protests and demonstrations occurred throughout 
June and July, with a group of Quakers being the most vocal outside group to 
show support for Abernathy as he served out his sentence.232  Emerging after 20 
days in jail, Abernathy promised that the Poor People’s Campaign was not over, 
and that phase two would take place on a national scale, but, as the Chicago 
Defender reported, “[H]e gave no details about his specific plans.”233  By then 
many Washingtonians were burned out on the campaign; some were outright 
resentful of what SCLC had left behind in its wake. Washington Post “Potomac 
Watch” columnist William Raspberry had already expressed sharp criticism of 
SCLC’s internal disorganization and poor handling of the press.234  In his July 1 
editorial “Remaining Poor Hinder Campaign,” Raspberry recounted the story of 
one such woman who had opposed the campaign, yet sought to help some of the 
children displaced by Resurrection City’s closure.  She told him “I’m part of what 
amounts to a cleanup committee.  We’re opposed to the Campaign, but the 
leaders know they can call on us when things get fouled up; there are always 
people like me who’ll do what they can to cover up other people’s goofs.”235  
Raspberry concluded the column by criticizing the campaign for not having 
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engaged local leaders earlier, a criticism that had been hurled at SCLC 
numerous times before, during, and after the PPC ended, especially with regards 
to local political figures.236 
 SCLC struggled in the wake of the PPC’s conclusion.  At the 12th 
Annual Convention in Memphis in August of 1968, rumors of contention among 
the ranks, especially the executive staff, proved to be unfounded, but the 
Chicago Defender reported that “signs of dissension over the present strategy of 
SCLC’s program in the Poor People’s Campaign were evident throughout the 
convention.”237  Affiliates from eastern and southern states attempted to propose 
an alternate platform for the organization, one focused on “ownership of the 
means of income” rather than just jobs; those delegates, however, were not even 
given time to present their alternatives.238  “Due to the urgent need to reduce 
staff,” SCLC once again found itself in the position of laying off employees at the 
national office in early October.239  The organization still owed the federal 
government over $71,000 for the cost of damages resulting from Resurrection 
City.  It would take another year for them to pay off the bill, for a negotiated 
settlement of $10,000.240  In the spring of 1969, Abernathy and SCLC leaders 
attempted to engage the organization in a second Poor People’s Campaign, with 
a broad focus “on the welfare, education, nutrition, housing and employment 
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problems of the nation’s poor,” and no mention of any encampment.241  Although 
the campaign garnered minor press attention, as well as an audience with 
President Richard Nixon, a frustrated, defeated Abernathy called off the event 
after just a few days in Washington.242 
 
Why Failure? 
 It would be easy to blame the Poor People’s Campaign’s inability to 
achieve any lasting, meaningful results on King’s assassination, on weather, on 
the Johnson administration, on Vietnam, or on any number of factors out of 
SCLC’s direct control.  But as this thesis has shown, the fault lies squarely with 
the perpetual lack of structure and strategy in this social welfare nonprofit 
organization.  The Poor People’s Campaign was not just a singular failure, either.  
It was a turning point for SCLC, the beginning of the end of its dominance among 
civil rights leaders and the formal and informal nonprofit organizations that had 
been created in support of the movement.  Three particular issues hampered 
SCLC’s ability to operate efficiently as a nonprofit, each ultimately contributing to 
the defeat of the PPC and the decline of the organization: an inability to adhere 
to a clear, actionable mission; a struggle to obtain tax exempt status; and an 
organizational inelasticity that prevented SCLC from being able to respond to the 
changing needs of those whom it served. 
 The unofficial mission statement of SCLC was “To Redeem the Soul of 
America,” an oft-repeated phrase that appears nowhere in the organization’s 
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Constitution and By-Laws; in reality, King had written the phrase on a window at 
SCLC’s headquarters.243  As the discussion of the bylaws in the first part of 
chapter three showed, SCLC originally intended to focus mainly on the South, 
and from the start had a very lofty, or some might say vague, mission.  Part III of 
the “Aims and Purposes” stated that SCLC was “organized as a service agency 
to facilitate coordinated action of local protest groups and to assist in their 
sharing of resources and experiences.”244  In other words, the organization itself 
would not provide any direct services; it would serve to support other formal and 
informal organizations “attempting to bring full democracy to our great nation.”245  
Almost immediately, however, SCLC violated its own directives by creating the 
“Crusade of Citizenship,” an initiative wholly of its own creation, and one for 
which the organization was ill suited to operate, as was shown in the second part 
of chapter three.  As SCLC grew and expanded, a case of what might be termed 
“mission evolution” occurred.  This situation can be defined as what occurs when 
an organization’s mission transforms over time in an attempt to stay relevant to 
the shifting demands of its core constituencies.  It might also be thought of as a 
less severe form of “mission creep,” a condition that arises when an 
organization’s operations and programs stray from its original stated mission, 
often spreading thin existing resources in an attempt to take on additional 
activities.246  In some instances, mission creep can be a good thing for a 
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nonprofit, as it demonstrates that the organization is changing in respond to 
needs both internal and external. 
 In the case of SCLC, however, such a “mission evolution” caused the 
organization to suffer the same setbacks time and again by refusing to learn from 
past mistakes.  Instead of thoroughly researching and strategizing before 
entering into a new campaign, a practice which would have greatly enhanced the 
organization’s ability to facilitate the coordination of local groups, SCLC relied on 
the force of King’s personality to achieve the organization’s goals.  Oftentimes - 
the Albany, St. Augustine, and Chicago campaigns are obvious examples - 
SCLC dropped into the middle of a campaign and created their own demands, 
the Albany, St. Augustine, and Chicago campaigns being obvious examples; 
those demands often were not necessarily aligned with those of the local 
organizations who had already been working for their own causes, creating 
tension among the groups and ultimately compromising SCLC’s effectiveness.247  
Had SCLC been disciplined enough to focus on its core strengths and listen 
more closely to the changing demands of those for whom it was designed to 
serve, it might have been far more effective at achieving the broad goal of “full 
democracy” that it desired.  In the absence of that discipline, the organization 
was forced to reinvent itself for nearly every campaign.  Undoubtedly SCLC 
made great strides in accomplishing its “basic aim of achieving full citizenship 
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rights, equality, and the integration of the Negro in all aspects of American life,” 
as the successes of Birmingham and Selma demonstrate.248  But with few 
opportunities for organizational learning and little development of a shared 
organizational memory, especially at the highest leadership levels, SCLC was 
unable to turn its “mission evolution” into a positive asset, which further 
hampered its ability to achieve success in the years leading up to and including 
the Poor People’s Campaign. 
 Fundraising challenges and financial fluctuations plagued SCLC for 
most of its existence.  As shown in chapters three and four, the organization’s 
fiscal health depended largely on its ability to leverage public relations for 
favorable press of King and select high-profile campaigns.  Unfortunately, due to 
repeated oversight by SCLC’s leadership, the organization was unable to accept 
tax-deductible donations, one of the major benefits of nonprofit status, until 1966.  
SCLC had certainly accepted donations since its inception, but the vast majority 
of those were individual, non-deductible donations, largely generated via the 
direct mail campaigns and newspaper advertisements.  Obtaining broader, 
sustained sources of funding, like the types of grants and awards pursued by the 
NAACP and the National Urban League, was impossible in the absence of the 
required IRS status.  For example, the organization was awarded a $26,000 
grant in 1961 from the Field Foundation for citizenship training, but had to turn 
down the offer.249  Wyatt Walker subsequently applied for 501(c)(4) nonprofit 
status for SCLC at the end of 1961, but failed to prove that the organization met 
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the IRS’s guidelines.  On January 2, 1962, Chauncey Eskridge, a lawyer at the 
firm of McCoy, Ming & Leighton, strongly advised that SCLC hire an outside 
accounting firm to manage its finances.250  That advice went unheeded and 
throughout 1962 Walker himself engaged in a back and forth with the IRS over 
the application status.251  Sloppy bookkeeping and poor communication 
continued to hamper SCLC’s ability to obtain this status, with Walker even going 
so far as to admit in a February 26 letter to the chief of the Exempt Organizations 
Branch of the IRS that it would take time to comply with the IRS’s request for 
information because “From date of incorporation through August 31, 1960 our 
financial statements were not prepared on a consistent fiscal year basis.”252  
Henry Wachtel, surprised to learn of the organization’s non-tax-exempt status, 
had attempted to set up a separate entity, the Gandhi Society, to accept such 
donations, but ongoing deliberations among SCLC staff and the IRS held up the 
process.253 
 By the end of 1962 SCLC had obtained 501(c)(4) status, but still did not 
have an easy way to accept tax-deductible donations from supporters.  Walker’s 
attention turned elsewhere, as he increasingly focused on traveling with King, 
who was on the road six to eight months a year for speaking engagements, and 
ensuring that SCLC “made the maximum amount of money” from those 
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speeches.254  When Walker left the organization in 1964, it was flush with cash 
from King’s speeches, but still struggling to communicate with individual 
supporters who believed SCLC to be a 501(c)(3) nonprofit like many other civil 
rights groups.  In October 1964, SCLC received a strongly worded letter from a 
donor’s lawyer, after the donor’s taxes were audited and the IRS denied his 
deducting a donation to SCLC.255  In a response to that letter, Andrew Young 
replied that the lawyer was correct; SCLC did not have 501(c)(3) status, but that 
donations could be made to the American Institute on Nonviolent Education, an 
“auxiliary unit” that had just that month received 501(c)(3) status.256  What Young 
probably meant to reference was the American Foundation on Nonviolence 
(AFON), the new name Wachtel had chosen for the Gandhi society (by then a 
501(c)(3)) as the main channel by which tax-exempt donations could be made to 
SCLC.257 
 Nearly a decade after SCLC’s founding, in April 1966, a letter from the 
U.S. Treasury Department to King stated that the newly formed Southern 
Christian Leadership Foundation was awarded 501(c)(3) status, making it an 
additional source of tax-exempt donations.258  By that time, however, the 
organization was again experiencing serious financial problems, as illustrated in 
chapter five, and the leadership was ill-equipped to fully exploit the opportunities 
presented by using the Foundation as a major funding stream.  It would be 
impossible to estimate the amount of donations SCLC was unable to accept in 
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the nearly ten years it took for it to create a tax-exempt entity with the same 
name and brand recognition as the organization.259  Walker’s fateful decision to 
ignore the advice of Eskridge and engage an outside accounting firm, and the 
ongoing lack of staff support for matters financial, only served to prevent SCLC 
from pursuing additional projects related to its mission.  The Atlanta office never 
did take seriously its need to develop and maintain a comprehensive fundraising 
program distinct from the direct mail campaign, with leadership consistently 
choosing instead to rely on King’s ability to command large speaking fees and 
drum up support through celebrity fundraising tours to make up for budget 
deficits.260  Likewise, the organization as a whole never had a realistic perception 
of how much it would cost to carry out its various campaigns, nor did budget 
surpluses last long enough to create any sense of financial stability, a pattern 
that continued through to the PPC.261 
 Equally detrimental to SCLC’s organizational effectiveness was that it 
never fully identified what Lester Salamon calls the direct, indirect, and/or 
community benefits that serve as the organizational foundation of a social service 
nonprofit.262  “In addition to the direct benefits that accrue to the immediate 
recipients of services, there are a variety of indirect or community benefits that 
accrue to a wide assortment of other people--family members, acquaintances, 
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neighbors, the general public.”263  Only when SCLC narrowly defined the scope 
of its campaigns was it successful in achieving these benefits.  The southern-
based campaigns that used targeted, non-violent direct action in pursuit of voter 
registration and equal access to public facilities, direct benefits to SCLC’s 
intended recipients, were also able to desegregate buses, integrate schools, 
register thousands of voters, and unseat racist elected officials, indirectly 
benefitting the entire community. 
 SCLC had only one taste of that success in the North, with Operation 
Breadbasket, a program that existed and thrived largely because it was outside 
of the direct control of the leadership of the national office.  The program used 
targeted consumer boycotts to demand that companies who sold to black 
shoppers provide jobs for black employees, a direct benefit strategy that resulted 
in 1,000 new white-collar jobs in Philadelphia, in addition to “selective buying 
efforts” in multiple major northern cities.264  Operations Breadbasket’s success in 
the wake of the PPC, however, was also its downfall, as the national SCLC office 
grew resentful of Director Jesse Jackson’s growing fame.265  Jackson, however, 
desired a greater say in the organization’s operations. In an interview with the 
Chicago Defender in August 1970, Abernathy defended SCLC’s decision not to 
amend its constitution in order to promote Jackson to first vice president-at-large, 
as doing so “would ‘further complicate the structure,’” even though rumors of 
                                            
263
 Ibid., emphasis in the original. 
264
 Felicia Kornbluh, The Battle for Welfare Rights: Politics and Poverty in Modern America 
(Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007) 120. 
265
 “Hint Major Split in SCLC,” Chicago Defender, May 31, 1969, 1. 
 88 
internal dissension were again running rampant.266  By the end of 1971, Jackson 
left the organization, “depriving SCLC of its most popular officer and most 
effective fundraiser.  It also robbed SCLC of it principal base in the North.”267  
Once again, SCLC leadership had failed to learn from past organizational 
mistakes.  Jackson had already been denied once during the PPC; he would not 
be denied again. 
 Had SCLC been able to capitalize on the successes of Montgomery, 
Birmingham, Selma, and Operation Breadbasket, and produce meaningful direct 
or indirect benefits in the intervening campaigns, then the organization might 
have had a clearer focus leading up to the Poor People’s Campaign.  The 
Baltimore Sun’s Joseph R. L. Sterne, writing on June 30, 1968 asserted that 
SCLC leaders operated tactically, not strategically, a “technique that worked 
admirably in those simpler days when the ‘race issue’ was...voting in 
Birmingham.”268 Sterne pointed out that the times had changed, with “a growing 
belief in Washington that nonviolent protest as a means of rousing the nation is 
giving way to a multitude of ghetto-oriented action programs.”269  SCLC, still “able 
to move in the vanguard” according to Sterne, was nonetheless an organization 
whose techniques were becoming “passé.”270  It had grown increasingly out of 
touch with both its direct recipients and those who might benefit tangentially from 
its efforts.  While the organization was struggling in the wake of the Chicago 
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campaign, the Black Panthers were administering free breakfast and healthcare 
services in East Oakland, California.271  While SCLC was still recovering from the 
aftermath of the PPC, the National Welfare Rights Organization was taking on 
the limitation of the Food Stamps program, arguing that its restrictions and 
limitations were ultimately detrimental to recipients.272 
 SCLC was unable to evolve in a strategic manner; it was stuck in the 
mindset of the mass direct actions of the early civil rights movement, with 
Resurrection City a relic of a bygone era.  In a December 14, 1968, interview with 
the Chicago Defender, Bernard Lafayette claimed that the PPC had achieved 
“about half” of its goals, including the creation of new food distribution programs 
and nearly $10 million in Congressional appropriations for school lunch 
programs.273  The article goes on, however, to recount a laundry list of demands 
that were not met, including “housing, employment, and welfare” reforms, along 
with changes to health care and education for the poor.274  The article concludes 
that “we can visualize some merit even if small” in the minor achievements of the 
PPC, but that only another campaign, “probably one that is not only better 
organized but inclusive of more people who will make more and bigger demands” 
would affect real change for the poor.275  SCLC was not the organization to rise 
to that challenge and, as such, was quickly relegated to an after-thought as the 
civil rights movements of the 1960s gave way to Black Nationalism, second-wave 
feminism, and student activism.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
SCHOLARLY RESEARCH 
 
Evolution of a Movement 
 By 1969 Richard Nixon was in office, the OEO had become one of the 
most controversial agencies in the federal government, and the civil rights 
movement was giving way to new calls for Black Nationalism and women’s 
liberation.276  Old-line civil rights movement organizations like SNCC spent the 
end of the decade shedding veteran members, only to find that the younger 
leadership, while still seeking ways to be engaged in the civil rights movement, 
was no longer interested in what was formerly SNCC’s core mission.277  In that 
way, the Poor People’s Campaign was symbolic of the movement as a whole.  A 
report issued two months after the end of the campaign concluded that “The 
Negro majority that registered at Resurrection city and traveled toward 
Washington late las [sic] spring, was mostly between the ages of 13 and 24, 
male, single, and poor.”278  The white participants were of a similar demographic, 
although the report found that most of them were “non-poor” college students.279  
That a significant number of youths were still interested in engaging in non-
violent direct action indicates that SCLC’s work was not completely irrelevant to a 
new generation.  They were simply unable to channel that youthful energy. 
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 The report concluded that the violent outbreaks among younger 
residents at Resurrection City could “have acted as an invisible social force in the 
campaign, one favoring the pursuit of personal (rather than organizational) goals, 
‘doing your own thing’ instead of ‘getting together,’ unless counteracted by 
strong, persuasive and consistent leadership.”280  As this paper has shown, 
SCLC was far from able to provide that kind of leadership.  Consequently, the 
organization lost out on a potentially huge opportunity to bring a new, youthful, 
truly grassroots base of supporters to its mission.  To assume that young donors 
and direct-action doers would be the prime movers to reignite civil rights 
organizations, however, would be to deny the growing complexities inherent to 
the movement at that time.  Marable adeptly summarizes the challenges facing 
all those who were engaged in the cause at the dawn of the 1970s:  
Thus, after the assassinations of Malcolm and Martin, the modern 
black movement for biracial democracy had been crippled, for sure, 
but it was by no means destroyed.  Yet the absence of a widely 
shared theory and strategy for black liberation was still missing; the 
political goal of black equality was still murky and ill-defined; the 
opportunism and accommodation of many black militants and 
political leaders still raised unresolved questions for future 
struggles; and the programmatic relationship between democracy 
and racial justice, socialism and peace that DuBois and King had 
strived to attain was becoming ever more distant.281 
 
Perhaps after over a dozen years in operation, SCLC’s work was no longer 
relevant to the struggle for racial equality.  Perhaps it was an organization whose 
time had come and gone.  Or perhaps it was just simply unable to operate 
without the glue of King’s force of personality holding it together, and no 
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campaign, whether focused on the poor or otherwise, would have achieved 
success under those conditions. 
 
Future Scholarship 
 This paper sought to examine the failures of the Poor People’s 
Campaign through the lens of SCLC’s organizational structure and strategy.  As I 
dug further into the primary document archive, it became apparent that I needed 
to examine more specifically the decision-making process of the leadership team 
and the ways in which SCLC prepared, or in many cases did not prepare, for its 
major campaigns.  A paper of this length and scope must necessarily be narrow 
in focus, but my research led me to consider additional theories as to why the 
PPC ended the way it did.  I would encourage future scholars to take up this 
topic, with its paucity of research yet rich sources of material as yet untapped, 
especially as it relates to the following three additional areas of research. 
 1) One aspect of SCLC not thoroughly discussed above was its roots in 
the black church, and how the management requirements of a preacher can be 
quite different from those of the leader of a nonprofit organization.  Did SCLC 
leadership run the organization too much like a church?  Churches fall under 
501(c)(3) status, making their purpose somewhat different from that of SCLC’s.  
However, King was known to rely on prayer as a recurring method of making 
crucial decisions, even if his advisors, including his own pastor father, disagreed 
with the outcome.282  At times, King’s “charismatic leadership,” rooted in his 
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training as a black preacher, compromised the health of the organization, as 
Aldon D. Morris, writing in The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, argues: 
“The SCLC leadership’s attitude toward formal organizations grew out of the 
charismatic and fluid personal relationships characteristic of the black church.” 283  
If SCLC was indeed “a church-related protest organization,” a direct extension of 
the black church structure and leadership in the South, as Morris argues quite 
convincingly, then SCLC’s chronic financial problems and the organization’s 
inability to budget properly when organizing its campaigns make sense.284  
Writing in The Black Church and the African American Experience, C. Eric 
Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya argue that 
While a few elite black churches and pastors have been engaged in 
important projects that could help the economic development of 
their local areas, the majority of pastors and churches lacked 
adequate knowledge about financial investments and about the 
economic development of their own institutions and that of the 
surrounding community.  One of the major weaknesses of the 
historic black denominations is in the area of training and teaching 
their denominational leaders, pastors, and laity about all aspects of 
economic stewardship, from careful record keeping, financial 
accountability, and investments to the economic development of 
their communities.285 
 
SCLC certainly exhibited many of those weaknesses from its inception through 
the end of the PPC. An examination of the standard management practices of 
black churches both North and South during the civil rights era might yield 
additional insight into SCLC’s operation and how the negative aspects of those 
practices informed it. 
                                            
283
 Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, 113. 
284
 Ibid., 87. 
285
 Eric C. Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya, The Black Church in the African American 
Experience (Durham: Duke University Press: 1990), 262. 
 94 
 2) Also research worthy is a closer examination of the board governance 
and how its relatively minor influence on the organization contributed to SCLC’s 
structural, financial, and strategic problems.  Fairclough points out that from its 
earliest days, SCLC’s decision makers included an “amorphous and ever-
expanding circle of friends, colleagues, and advisers.  Of these, least important 
was SCLC’s board of directors.”286  In a 1968 report to the executive board, 
Rutherford confirmed that a deep skepticism of the usefulness of official decision 
making bodies within the organization still existed, only half joking when he 
stated, “I am intimidated because of the basic tendency of Boards of Directors to 
allow their Executives to work without advice or supervision and then throw rocks 
at them after the fact, whenever possible.”287  King relied on advisors like Stanley 
Levison and Bayard Rustin far more than he ever consulted any member of the 
board; Levison never formally worked for the organization.288  A scholar of 
nonprofit governance might find an excellent case study with SCLC. 
 3) Missing from most accounts of the PPC is an integration of the voices 
of the people it was designed to serve.  During their time at the camp, 
participants were instructed never to speak directly to the press, even though 
their personal stories were being used for PR purposes.289  As such, scholars 
might find it challenging to research additional first-hand accounts of the march, 
especially those from the viewpoint of any who left their homes behind to live in 
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Resurrection City.  Examining how - if at all - the PPC affected the lives of the 
poor participants after they returned to their homes might yield more fruitful 
results.  Were participants’ long-term economic situation improved as a result of 
having been a part of the campaign?  Were they changed by the experience in a 
way that had far-reaching effects on their families and communities?  Because 
the vast majority of Resurrection City residents were members of racial and 
ethnic minorities it would be beneficial to examine contemporary black 
newspapers and periodicals (e.g. Atlanta Daily World, The Crisis, Ebony, and 
Jet), as well as periodicals aimed at Native American and Chicano audiences.  
Special emphasis could also be placed on rural Southern publications or those 
affiliated with black churches.  
 Additional topics to explore would include a more thorough evaluation of 
SCLC’s southern operations versus its northern ones.  I was only briefly able to 
touch upon the Chicago campaign, but it’s worth noting that while SCLC’s 
attempt to achieve open housing in the city was almost completely rebuffed, 
Jesse Jackson successfully organized Operation Breadbasket there as part of 
the same effort.  Likewise, the New York office managed an efficient, effective 
direct mail program, something the national office never even attempted.  It is 
possible that unless King himself was present, northern campaigns and offices 
operated largely outside of the rest of the organization, possibly making them 
immune to its shortcomings and consequently more successful.  Also essential to 
this line of research is a comparison of SCLC’s affiliates in both the North and the 
South.  Understanding how the national office affected these loosely coordinated 
 96 
support organizations could yield a deeper understanding of how SCLC chose to 
coordinate outside groups for the PPC. 
 
Conclusion 
 The legacy of the Poor People’s Campaign, however, is not entirely one 
of negative outcomes.  While the demands of the campaign that were met 
numbered in the low single digits, and the overall impact of participants’ 
demonstrations and sit-ins on Capitol Hill was minimal, there were a few critics 
who found positive aspects.290  The PPC was a failure in the sense that it was 
unable to achieve its stated goals, but that does not mean that SCLC as a while 
was a failed organization, or that Abernathy should be judged as a failed leader 
based upon just this campaign.  Likewise King’s legacy, while not enhanced by 
the way SCLC carried out his final vision, was certainly not diminished by it.291  In 
the epilogue to From Civil Rights to Human Rights Jackson reaches the 
conclusion that “we can give King and his generation more credit for changing 
the country than he could at the time...The freedom movement, the civil rights 
acts, and the war on poverty did not eradicate racism and poverty.  But 
cumulatively they helped raise black incomes, improved the quality of life in many 
black communities, and provided training grounds for the thousands of black 
elected officials who followed.”292 
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 The campaign had also asked an important question both of SCLC 
leadership and PPC participants: How do you address power?  And while the 
organization may not have fully known how to answer that question, there is no 
doubt that many participants were given a sense of agency just by virtue of 
participating.  Kay Shannon, the D.C. Coordinator for Resurrection City, recalled 
residents feeling a “fierce pride” in their self-made shantytown.293  Certainly any 
campaign that instills in its participants a feeling of hope for the future cannot be 
called a complete failure. 
 Perhaps the greatest impact of the PPC is only now being realized.  In 
the wake of Occupy movements around the world, the goals of the PPC seem in 
some ways more relevant than ever.  Cameron Turner, writing in the Los Angeles 
Sentinal, argues that “If Dr. King were alive today, he certainly would be voicing 
strong support for the Occupy Wall Street movement,” citing King’s sentiments in 
his 1967 speech “Where Do We Go From Here” as evidence that King’s fight for 
economic equality and the rights of the poor was very much in line with the 
demands of the “99%.”294  There is much to be said for that argument, and the 
similarities between the campaigns are obvious: building coalitions of diverse 
supporters, emphasizing non-violent direct action, providing amenities and 
resources to participants to which they might not otherwise have access, and 
focusing on the seats of power as potential sources of change.  An October 2011 
editorial in the New York Times regarding Occupy Wall Street could have been 
written about the PPC as well.  It closes with this: “It is not the job of the 
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protesters to draft legislation. That’s the job of the nation’s leaders, and if they 
had been doing it all along there might not be a need for these marches and 
rallies. Because they have not, the public airing of grievances is a legitimate and 
important end in itself.”295  Likewise, a New York Times editorial from June 1968 
seems shockingly contemporary: 
But, by their example of nonviolent discipline in submitting 
peacefully to arrest, the campaigners did earn respect for their 
convictions.  The orderly behavior of protestors and police in the 
Washington evacuation should have served as an object lesson 
that it is possible to entertain strong dissent in this country, even to 
the point of civil disobedience, without endangering the foundation 
of law and order on which the rights and liberties of all Americans 
rest.296 
 
As an object lesson, as an exercise in democracy, and as a public statement on 
the realities faced by the least among us, the Poor People’s Campaign was a 
success.  It could have been so much more had SCLC given it the chance.
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